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Given the current evolution of warfare, the rise of non-state actors and rogue states, in 
conjunction with the wide availability and relative parity of information technology, the 
U.S. will need to examine new and innovative ways to modernize its irregular warfare 
fighting capabilities. Within its irregular warfare capabilities, the U.S. will need to 
identify effective doctrine and strategies to leverage its tactical and technical advantages 
in the conduct of unconventional warfare. Rather than take a traditional approach to 
achieve unconventional warfare objectives via conventional means, this thesis proposes 
that unconventional warfare can evolve to achieve greater successes using the process of 
unconventional cyber warfare. 
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A. GENERAL AREA OF RESEARCH 
With the current evolution of warfare shifting from conventional to irregular 
conflicts, with the rise of non-state actors and rogue states, in conjunction with the wide 
availability and relative parity of information technology, and with current and expected 
future cuts in defense spending, the U.S. will need to examine new and innovative ways 
to modernize its irregular warfighting capabilities. Within its irregular warfare 
capabilities the U.S. will need to identify effective doctrine and strategies to leverage its 
tactical and technical advantage in the conduct of unconventional warfare. Rather than 
take a traditional approach to achieve unconventional warfare objectives via conventional 
means, this thesis proposes that unconventional warfare can evolve to achieve the same, 
as well as greater successes using unconventional cyber warfare.  
B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and explore a new irregular warfare option 
for the United States: unconventional cyber warfare (UCW). Specifically, this thesis will 
demonstrate cyber warfare is a viable option during unconventional warfare and how 
UCW can employ existing capabilities to achieve successful unconventional warfare 
interventions. Marine Corps General James E Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff provides this definition for cyber operations: “the employment of 
cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects 
in or through cyberspace.”1 FM 3-05.130 Army Special Operations Forces 
Unconventional Warfare (U) provides the current definition of UW as follows: 
“operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance 
1 James E. Cartwright, Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations, JCS Memorandum, November 
2010, 8, http://www.nsci-va.org/CyberReferenceLib/2010-11-Joint Terminology for Cyberspace 
Operations.pdf. 
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movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations.”2 For the purposes of this 
thesis, unconventional cyber warfare (UCW) will be tentatively defined as seeking to 
achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace by, with, or through 
irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional 
military operations. Initial research indicates that the U.S. has yet to formulate clear 
guidelines on how to employ cyber warfare to coerce, disrupt, or deter adversaries. 
However, examination of research on cyber warfare indicates that these capabilities have 
been and will be employed in an offensive manner by states and non-state actors within 
the scope of cyber warfare to achieve national, regional, and local objectives.  
C. BACKGROUND 
Recent events have demonstrated the rise in global technical acumen as well as 
the national will of our adversaries and allies alike to employ cyber warfare as a means of 
accomplishing political and military objectives. As a result the Department of Defense 
has increasingly emphasized cyber warfare with the creation of Cyber Command to 
address concerns and to develop a national capability with regard to the conduct of cyber 
warfare. A major concern for cyber warfare and unconventional warfare is the apparent 
lack of doctrinal integration.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis intends to answer the following research question: how can cyber 
warfare be utilized in unconventional warfare campaigns? To answer this question two 
additional research questions will be examined. First, the thesis will attempt to determine 
if existing cyber warfare capabilities will allow for successful unconventional warfare 
interventions. Secondly, it will examine whether working through surrogates will allow 
for greater access and preserve the clandestine or covert nature of an UCW intervention. 
While few countries have engaged in UCW as a strategy within the confines of our 
definition, historical cases of UCW do exist to warrant the main research question.  
2 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare 
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 1–2, http://orfeu-
marketing.com/data/documents/A9R7039.pdf. 
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E. CENTRAL CLAIM 
The central claim of this thesis is that cyber warfare can be an effective tool in 
achieving U.S. strategic goals within the measured response available via a UW 
campaign, and that it should play an important role in future UW campaigns. However, 
the appropriate use of cyber warfare depends less on the operational environment than 
other factors, including the capabilities of the opposing forces, level of access to their 
systems, and the resistance force to be used as a cyber-militia. Looking at the spectrum of 
unconventional warfare objectives: disrupt—coerce—overthrow, in relation to the 
relative technical capabilities of a given country, will assist in determining what goals the 
U.S. should work to obtain via cyber warfare. For instance, one set of conditions on the 
ground, such as the ones found in Georgia, may mean that cyber means could be used in 
an effort to disrupt the nation’s capabilities in parallel with a concurrent ground 
offensive. On the other hand, in Syria for example, cyber means were employed in 
support of the oppressive Assad regime and its policies. To help strategists determine 
whether and how cyber warfare can support a UW campaign in a given country or 
situation, this thesis will develop an unconventional cyber warfare employment 
methodology.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
The amount of literature addressing how existing cyber warfare capabilities 
should and could be employed is extensive and expresses opinions that range from cyber 
warfare being a near infinite threat to governments and organizations to cyberwar has 
never happened, and will never happen.3 This thesis will identify theories or principles of 
cyber warfare, approaches to address cyberwar concerns, potential vulnerabilities to 
cyber-attacks, and how the cyber domain compares to other domains of warfare. It is the 
goal of this thesis to provide a possible scenario whereby the U.S. might employ 
offensive cyber warfare in a manner that brings offensive military intervention into the 
21st century. 
3 Thomas Rid, “Cyber War Will Not Take Place,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 1 (2012): 5–32, 
doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.608939. 
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The research question will attempt to examine if working through surrogates 
allows for greater access and preserves the clandestine or covert nature of an UCW 
intervention. Previous research examines how “guerrilla warfare” is the least likely form 
of unconventional warfare that will occur in modern times, how the focus should be on 
indirect activities of unconventional warfare: subversion, sabotage, and intelligence 
activities, and goes so far as to espouse the establishment of a separate branch of military 
service, solely focused on the conduct of unconventional warfare.4 It does not, however, 
examine how new and emerging capabilities could be employed, within the traditional 
tenants of unconventional warfare, to achieve the desired state intervention that is 
traditionally associated with the conduct of unconventional warfare. This thesis will 
scrutinize empirical evidence from selected case studies to determine the critical factors 
of how to accomplish the essential components of unconventional warfare intervention. 
As the U.S. moves away from employment of conventional military power into 
the IW realm of cyber operations and unconventional operations, strategists and military 
theorists will need to embrace the capabilities of emerging technologies while 
recognizing the real world requirement of working by, with, and through indigenous 
forces to achieve our foreign policy objectives. Conventional military intervention in 
response to threats to national security by state and non-state actors may not be feasible. 
Kinetic operations may be too risky or have too much collateral damage associated with 
their outcomes, and may also curtail the opportunity for a measured response. Under 
certain conditions, UCW may serve as a more effective means of conducting an 
unconventional intervention to achieve national military objectives.  
1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework of this thesis draws from three major areas, 
conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyber warfare. The conventional warfare 
area is comprised of conventional military weapons and battlefield tactics. The area of 
irregular warfare is similar to conventional warfare in that it encompasses conventional 
4 Steven P. Basilici and Jeremy Simmons, “Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional 
Warfare” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 4. 
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weapons and tactics. However, it differs in that it is primarily via indirect or 
asymmetrical means. This area also includes the sub-area of unconventional warfare. The 
cyber warfare area is comprised of actions taken against an entity’s computers or 
networks. Based on the overlapping regions of these areas there are eleven sub-areas as 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Warfighting areas conceptual diagram 
Nine of the sub-areas will be briefly addressed, but not analyzed as previous research or 
governing doctrine already exists for them. The focus area for this thesis will be the 
remaining two sub-areas, where unconventional warfare, cyber warfare, and conventional 
warfare overlap. This focused area of overlap highlights the required pre-conditions for 
the employment of unconventional cyber warfare to accomplish a successful intervention 
2. CASE STUDIES 
This thesis will primarily use the method of discovery and the congruence method 
to examine when and how to successfully conduct unconventional cyber warfare. The 
method of discovery will rely on historical process-tracing to analyze the event chain in 
each case to illustrate how these cyber organizations used a unifying message, their 
means of disseminating the message, and their cyber means to achieve the desired effects. 
 5 
This inductive approach will allow the examination of the cases into causal chains, 
highlighting each individual evolution in the chain.  
Empirically, three cases will be analyzed in detail: the Russo-Georgian Conflict; 
the Syrian Electronic Army; and the Anonymous operations during the Arab Spring. 
These cases each demonstrate key facets that will make them valuable when developing a 
future model for UCW. The Russo-Georgian conflict was a combined cyber-kinetic 
conflict pitting Russian nationalist hackers and the Russian military against Georgia. In 
this conflict, via a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, the attackers were able to 
disrupt access to Georgia’s Internet and several government websites while the Russian 
military was able to invade in support of the South Ossetian breakaway region of 
Georgia.5 This case will contribute to the proposed UCW framework by its employment 
of a nationalist cyber militia and in its contribution to the overall success of the 
concurrent conventional conflict. The second case, Syrian Electronic Army, is a series of 
coordinated cyber-attacks by non-state Syrian actors loyal to the Assad regime targeting 
opposition forces, both foreign and domestic, in support of the regimes position in the 
Syrian civil conflict.6 This case contributes to the proposed UCW framework in that it 
demonstrates a possible means of creating a cyber-militia leveraging existing expertise in 
the UCWOA. The third case, Anonymous, involved multiple cyber-attacks against 
national infrastructure in order to support revolutionary movements during the Tunisian 
chapter of the Arab Spring.7 This case will contribute to the proposed UCW framework 
by demonstrating the opportunity to leverage an existing cyber-militia like organization 
by repurposing an existing organization to serve the need of the sponsor in a UCW 
conflict. 
5 Dancho Danchev, “Coordinated Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack in Progress,” Security, ZDNet, 
August 11, 2008, http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/coordinated-russia-vs-georgia-cyber-attack-in-
progress/1670. 
6 Helmi Noman, “The Emergence of Open and Organized Pro-Government Cyber Attacks in the 
Middle East: The Case of the Syrian Electronic Army,” Infowar Monitor: Tracking Cyberpower, May 30, 
2011, http://www.infowar-monitor.net/2011/05/7349/. 
7 Sulome Anderson, “Anonymous Threatens Morsy with Cyberwarfare,” Foreign Policy, November 
28, 2012, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/28/anonymous_threatens_morsy_with_cyberattacks. 
 6 
                                                 
G. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II describes the three 
areas of warfare that relate to UCW: irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, and cyber 
warfare. Chapter III discusses legal, ethical, and attribution issues associated with UCW. 
Chapter IV covers the three cases outlined above. Chapter V discusses when and where 
to apply UCW and offers a framework for its application based on the current phases of 
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II. WARFIGHTING AND UNCONVENTIONAL CYBER 
WARFARE 
In this chapter, we will examine the areas of warfighting that bear upon the 
concept of UCW. These areas consist of irregular warfare (IW), unconventional warfare 
(UW), and cyber warfare. We will seek to define each domain, look at key factors of the 
domain, and how they may influence our proposed warfighting concept, UCW. 
A. IRREGULAR WARFARE 
With a concept as complicated as irregular warfare it is usually best to start with a 
definition to create a common frame work. The Department of Defense defines irregular 
warfare as: 
Irregular Warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for 
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect 
and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of 
military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, 
influence, and will.8 
When examining the foundation of an IW operation it is important to understand who is 
conducting the action, how the action is being conducted, and why the action is being 
conducted.9 The underlying principle that differentiates IW from conventional warfare is 
its focus on a specific population. In an IW campaign it is necessary to exert control or 
influence over said population, for the purpose of either stabilizing or destabilizing the 
legitimacy of the political authority over the specific population.10 
Since World War II, the majority of warfare that the U.S. has been involved in has 
been irregular in nature. Our opponents today, both state and non-state alike, are not 
likely to be defeated by conventional military power alone. In order for the U.S. to be 
8 U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Marine Corps, “Irregular Warfare Joint Operating 





                                                 
successful in battle, it must intertwine the facets of social, cultural, political, information, 
and economic activities with the added complexity of supporting or destabilizing foreign 
governments, and their security forces, to defeat an unconventional enemy via 
unconventional means.11 U.S. forces currently confront a conundrum with regard to ways 
and means regarding IW operations. From an organizational, training and equipping 
standpoint, the U.S. is much better suited and configured to meet its responsibilities 
regarding a conventional conflict, however, from an IW perspective, U.S. forces are not 
equally trained, equipped, nor organized to meet its responsibilities regarding that 
spectrum of conflict.12 By the end of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the 
Department of Defense (DOD) senior leadership determined that it was underfunded in 
both general purpose forces and special operations forces (SOF), as well as both 
capabilities and capacity to conduct protracted IW.13  
When it comes to the actual execution of IW, how do we know if and when we 
are successful? The basis for acquisition and operational planning for U.S. forces has 
traditionally been dependent upon analysis of conventional war fighting and presents a 
real bias towards “measuring physical effects on near-peer forces, played out over days or 
months, of a maneuver attrition campaign.”14 Traditional measures of success in military 
operations, which have largely consisted of control of the battle space, and the size and 
force structure of the friendly order of battle, would be effective at evaluating “force-on-
force battles in a Clausewitzian style engagement.”15 Applying these measures of 
effectiveness to an IW scenario, where the forces are generally small, may not necessarily 
have territory under their control, and seldom engage via traditional tactics or means, 
would be ineffective at best.16 Traditional IW assessments have been tied to three factors, 
11 Kenneth C. Coons, Jr. and Glenn M. Harned, “Irregular Warfare Is Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly 
1st Quarter 2009, no. 52 (2009): 99. 
12 Ibid., 98. 
13 Ibid. 
14 James Clancy and Chuck Crossett, “Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare,” Parameters 37, 
no. 2 (June 22, 2007): 13. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 91. 
 10 
                                                 
sustainability, legitimacy, and environmental stability, with the measures of effectiveness 
(MOE) of an irregular force determined by these three factors.17 Based on current 
definitions of IW, measures for success should be population oriented, rather than 
adversary oriented, with measures of success tied to winning the support of friendly 
populations, supporting friendly authorities, and eroding the power structures of 
adversarial powers.18  
The world we live has changed dramatically. The familiar landscape of the Cold 
War is giving way to a mosaic of state and non-state actors, all jostling for power and 
position, while employing the elements of national power they may be able to bring to 
bear. With the number of failed states on the rise and a growing trend in some parts of the 
world for physical security to become an article of trade, powers arise to contest with the 
central government. In addition, there are cases where the legitimate government can no 
longer provide for the security of their populaces.19 These forces, by their nature as non-
state actors, will have to look to asymmetric means, such as IW, because they will lack 
the capabilities to employ and succeed by means of conventional warfare. Answering an 
irregular threat with a conventional response is a recipe for disaster; in order for our 
efforts to be successful we “must use a blend of political, informational, military, 
economic, and sociocultural approaches, in combination with foreign governments, 
security forces, and populations.”20 Employing an indirect approach, via cooperative 
action with a surrogate force within a contested area, would allow the U.S. to tailor its 
response to enable these partner forces to combat irregular threats via training, equipping, 
technology sharing, and other similar proven practices.21 An indirect approach alone is 
not enough though; it will require a long-term commitment to this surrogate relationship 
17 Ibid., 97. 
18 Coons, Jr. and Harned, “Irregular Warfare Is Warfare,” 99. 
19 Theresa Reinold, “State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11,” 
The American Journal of International Law 105, no. 2 (April 2011): 4–5, 
doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.105.2.0244. 
20 Coons, Jr. and Harned, “Irregular Warfare Is Warfare,” 99. 
21 Eric T. Olson, “A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare,” The Journal of International Security 
Affairs, no. 16 (2009): 3. 
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to make any lasting change, change that will over time contribute to the stability of a 
region, deny safe-havens for insurgents, and deter the future development of irregular 
opposition forces.22 
Irregular warfare, by all indications, will become the standard and not the 
exception for the types of conflicts that the U.S. will face in the foreseeable future. 
Responding to an irregular threat with conventional forces will not provide the proper 
force structure or tools for success against an irregular opponent. The U.S. has identified 
and begun modifications to doctrine and force structure development to position itself to 
succeed in an IW conflict, but that work is not complete. Current efforts continue to be 
based on the tried and true tactics and techniques that were established and honed during 
the IW campaigns in Vietnam. In order to succeed against the irregular combatant of 
today we need to be able to evolve from the old mantra “hearts and minds,” to a more 21st 
century centric mantra of social media and networks. By combining the historical 
principals of IW, such as by, with, and through, with the modern constructs like social 
media and complex networks, the U.S. can position itself for continued success in the 
population centric irregular warfare domain. 
B. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE  
Since its inception, U.S. Army Special Forces has been recognized as the nation’s 
preeminent unconventional warfare (UW) force. Unfortunately, the lexicon of terms 
utilized by practitioners and non-practitioners alike to describe what exactly UW is has 
become confusing. However, two themes have remained consistent through multiple UW 
definition revisions; UW is conducted through, with, or by a surrogate force and the 
surrogate force is irregular in nature.23 Unconventional warfare is not the inverse of 
conventional warfare. Conventional warfare seeks to employ general purpose forces 
(GPF) to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s military capability, 
22 Ibid., 5. 
23 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, 
1–2. 
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and coerce, through force, an adversary’s government.24 UW can be employed against 
state or non-state actors and may or may not involve direct military confrontation.25 
Just as UW is not conventional warfare, it is also not irregular warfare. As 
previously discussed, IW seeks to influence relevant populations and may employ the full 
range of military and other capabilities to do so.26 Whereas UW also seeks to influence 
relevant populations, IW does not require that operations be conducted by, with, or 
through irregular forces. UW may be conducted within an IW campaign and as a method 
for conducting IW, but because UW is used to support insurgencies, resistance 
movements, and conventional military operations, by, through, or with surrogate forces, it 
is precluded from being categorized as solely an IW activity.27 
Last, unconventional warfare is also not asymmetric warfare, unrestricted warfare, 
or fourth generation warfare (4GW). While it is useful to characterize UW as asymmetric 
in its application of techniques and activities to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a 
government, the term asymmetric warfare refers more to the disparity between two 
opponents’ strengths, sizes, capabilities, rather than the employment of irregular forces. 
Furthermore, there is no approved definition the use of the term “asymmetric warfare.” 
Similarly, 4GW and unrestricted warfare also lack an accepted DOD definition and 
associated doctrine. While both propose there is a new era that has been entered into with 
respect to the way in which war is conducted, the later advocates for less restrictions and 
greater breadth of tools and capabilities with which to prosecute war; ultimately none 
directly address the central idea that UW is conducted by, with, or through surrogate 
forces of an irregular nature.28 
24 U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Marine Corps, “Irregular Warfare Joint Operating 
Concept.” 
25 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, 
1–4. 
26 U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Marine Corps, “Irregular Warfare Joint Operating 
Concept.” 
27 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, 
1–7. 
28 Ibid., J-3 – J-4. 
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As the U.S. continues to be the dominant military power, nation-states and non-
state actors will continue to develop methods with which to avoid direct military conflict. 
Similarly the U.S. should maintain a measured response to counter such developments. 
Unconventional Warfare remains beneficial to the U.S. as a response because it provides 
a capability to cope with situations where strategic interests exist, but an optimal solution, 
in terms of the application of conventional military force, does not.29 This is not to 
suggest that the definition of UW should not be further refined, nor does it advocate that 
doctrine not be revised and updated to acknowledge the vast technological 
accomplishments that have occurred since the idea of UW was first advanced. On the 
contrary, UW theory and doctrine should be focused on the development of capabilities 
that capitalize on the current operating environment in order to remain relevant, 
particularly if theories advancing the notion of 4GW and unrestricted warfare gain 
traction with our adversaries.  
C. CYBER WARFARE  
The conceptual framework for cyber warfare will be examined in the context of 
cyber policy, cyber strategy, and asymmetric warfare. Marine Corps General James E 
Cartwright, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides this definition for 
cyber operations: “the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to 
achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace.”30 There is little about 
cyber warfare that is standardized and because of the nature of cyberspace what is known 
is in a near constant state of change. This section will provide a point of departure in our 
understanding of cyber warfare as we expand on the concept of UCW. 
Cyber policy is having trouble keeping up with the changing times; gone are the 
days when the most significant threat in cyberspace was isolated hackers. Today, cyber 
policy must contend with sophisticated state actors, and a myriad of non-state actors 
29 Basilici and Simmons, “Transformation,” 17. 
30 Cartwright, Joint Terminology for Cyberspace Operations, 8. 
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consisting of transnational crime organizations, “hacktivists,” and patriotic hackers.31 
There is a great deal of reluctance to implement any type of systematic cyber policy 
because  
the government does not own the Internet, other major elements of 
cyberspace, or most of the critical infrastructures that depend on the 
Internet, and because there are strong incentives for many groups to resist 
measures that would help secure the Internet.32  
The tendency for policy makers is to focus cyber warfare policy on historical precedents 
of historical warfare domains generally resulting in policy constrained by historical 
“attributes of military operations, such as mass, speed, synchronization, fires, command-
and-control, and hierarchy, at the expense of other ways, such as engineering, as a way of 
creating or preventing effects.”33 In an unconventional warfare scenario, it would be 
possible to exploit the overall reluctance to adopt a global cyber policy, and in doing so 
neutralize opponents who rely on networked systems for operations or, possibly, to 
leverage this dependence in an asymmetric manner thus leaving their militaries less 
capable than if they had never adopted networked systems.34  
Libicki, in “Cyberspace is not a Warfighting Domain,” proposed that because of 
the factors of economy, certainty, and risk, cyberspace should be the preferred means of 
accomplishing one’s desired effects in war.35 To accomplish ones ends, cyber strategy 
should exploit the capabilities of the targeted opponent’s systems. When one’s opponent 
is vulnerable within cyberspace, then the opponents overall dependence on networks and 
systems should be the governing factor when determining whether to employ cyber as an 
operational means.36 The concept of cyber power revolves around the low barriers to 
31 Terrence K. Kelly and Jeffrey Allen Hunker, “Cyber Policy,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for 
the Information Society 8, no. 2 (Fall 2012): 1. 
32 Ibid., 216. 
33 Martin C. Libicki, “Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting Domain,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for 
the Information Society 8 (2013 2012): 328. 
34 Ibid., 330. 
35 Ibid., 324. 
36 Ibid., 323. 
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entry and relatively limited cost of exerting influences on many facets of a society, from 
war to commerce. Ideally cyber means will be employed where one can create “preferred 
outcomes within cyberspace or cyber instruments can be used to produce preferred 
outcomes in other domains outside cyberspace.”37 As an adjunct to unconventional 
warfare, the strategic employment of cyber operations can achieve soft power in cyber 
space through agenda framing, attraction or persuasion.38 In addition, in an 
unconventional warfare scenario, the strategic employment of cyber operations can 
achieve hard power to organize a distributed denial of service attack by using cyber 
militias to attack target’s systems, or to insert malicious code designed to disrupt systems, 
or to steal intellectual property.39 
The most capable adversary that one may encounter is the one that can attack your 
weaknesses from a position of relative strength without you knowing the attack is 
coming. Cyberwar has the potential to be the latest asymmetrical warfighting arena where 
a less powerful, or inferior force, may hope to gain parity and contest successfully with a 
much larger and stronger adversary. Clarke and Knake point out four key asymmetries 
that highlight the U.S.’s susceptibility to cyber-attacks: higher dependency on cyber 
enabled systems than any potential adversary, dispersal of essential systems in the private 
sector, the individual and collective political power of those private sector actors to 
prevent or dilute government regulation, and lastly the U.S. military’s reliance on 
information sharing at all levels with the vulnerabilities to cyber-attack associated with 
these practices.40 With ever increasing constraints on military budgets, the impetus is on 
military thinkers to create and employ capabilities to defeat the opponents they face, 
rather than choosing their opponents based on their current capabilities.41 Our adversaries 
37 Joseph S. Nye, Cyber Power (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Harvard Kennedy 
School, May 2010), 4, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA522626. 
38 Ibid., 5. 
39 Ibid., 6. 
40 Richard A Clarke, Cyber War (HarperCollins, 2011), 226–227. 
41 Charles Billo and Welton Chang, Cyber Warfare an Analysis of the Means and Motivations of 
Selected Nation States (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College, December 2004), 30, 
http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/docs/cyberwarfare.pdf. 
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recognize the significant role that cyber operations can play in offsetting an opponent’s 
military superiority and see cyber operations as a cost effective means of conducting 
asymmetric warfare.42 Nye points out that: 
Cyberspace may create some power shifts among states by opening 
limited opportunities for leapfrogging by small states using asymmetrical 
warfare; it is unlikely to be a game changer in power transitions. On the 
other hand, while leaving governments the strongest actors, the cyber 
domain is likely to increase the diffusion of power to non-state actors, and 
illustrates the importance of networks as a key dimension of power in the 
21st century.43 
Significant to the special operations community is the stated or implied opportunity to 
accomplish cyber effects via a proxy force, laying the foundation for future research on 
uses of a cyber-militia as a resistance force.  
42 Ibid., 29. 
43 Nye, Cyber Power, 19. 
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III. LEGAL, ETHICAL, AND ATTRIBUTION ASPECTS OF 
UNCONVENTIONAL CYBER WARFARE 
This chapter will provide an examination of the legal, ethical, and attribution 
considerations and how they may apply to UCW. Particular consideration will be paid to 
how UCW could be viewed by the international community and how it may fit into 
current and future international law. While presented as subtopics it should be noted that 
each of these areas of consideration are interrelated and interdependent and should not be 
considered in a standalone manner. In this chapter we contend that there is an existing 
construct applicable to warfare and even though UCW is a new approach it should be 
governed by the existing legal, ethical and attribution considerations as applied to current 
conflicts. 
A. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS  
With the ever increasing reliance on computers and networks for day to day 
operations, both in the civilian and military sectors, it has become increasingly important 
to gain a legal understanding of how cyber operations will be viewed in terms of 
international law. It is widely recognized that attacks within the cyber realm can be of 
strategic, operational, and tactical importance. Cyber operations have been demonstrated 
to be effective at accomplishing military objectives with similar effects as psychological 
operation, electronic warfare operation (EW), or kinetic attacks.44 The very facet of 
networks that makes them such an integral piece of day to day operations is also the 
decisive feature that makes them a desirable target for cyber operations.45 This in turn 
creates an attractive asymmetrical threat, whereby a weaker power can compete with a 
stronger power, via a means that negates the power base of its opponent, by employing a 
low-risk and low-cost option to achieve its goals.46 In The Law of Cyber Attack, the 
44 Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: 
Thoughts on a Normative Framework, Information, 1999, 891, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1603800. 
45 Ibid., 893. 
46 Ibid., 897. 
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authors propose the following distinctions for cyber operations: cyber-crime (only non-
state actors, violation of criminal law), cyber-attack (objective to undermine function of 
computer network, must have political or national security purpose), and cyberwar 
(objective to undermine function of computer network, must have political or national 
security purpose, equivalent to armed attack or occurring during armed conflict).47 In a 
UCW scenario, cyber operations would often be conducted by non-state actors opposed 
to the State’s sovereign authority. The tendency may be to categorize these actions as 
cyber-crime, but due to the actions being in support of a political position, or in 
opposition to a nation’s security, these acts would be governed by the same rules that 
govern cyber-attack.48  
There is an ongoing debate as to whether cyberspace requires its own body of law 
or if instead existing law applies to cyberspace, whence it is a matter of identifying 
existing legal principles that can be effectively applied to the “person, place, object or 
type of activity in question.”49 Cyber-attacks, under certain conditions, may be 
considered a use of force, and therefore prohibited within the UN Charter, with the 
exceptions of self-defense, and UN Security Council mandate.50 Cyber-attacks that have 
a clear kinetic parallel are easily categorized based on this precept. Controversy arises 
when discussing state responsibility for acts committed by non-state actors, in our case a 
resistance or proxy force, and also acts that do not result in injury or damage.51 The issue 
of non-state actors is addressed by citing the International Court of Justice Nicaragua 
case that found that funding guerrillas who are conducting armed opposition against a 
state did not constitute an armed attack, but that arming and training them did; a decision 
that also suggested the consequences of an action need not be immediate to rise to the 
47 Oona A. Hathaway et al., “The Law of Cyber-Attack,” California Law Review 100 (2012): 817. 
48 Ibid., 815. 
49 Michael N. Schmitt, “International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual 
Juxtaposed,” The Harvard International Law Journal Online 54 (December 12, 2012): 17. 
50 Ibid., 18–19. 
51 Ibid. 
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level of a use of force.52 These experts found that a cyber-attack would not have to 
include immediate consequences in the physical world and that arming a proxy force with 
the means of conducting cyber operations against a state would be consistent with an 
armed attack, but providing them with a safe haven would not.53 If states desire to bypass 
the use of force constraint, highlighting the challenge of distinction in cyber warfare 
today, they may hide their involvement in cyber-attacks by permitting civilians as 
irregular armed forces to carry out cyber-attacks on their behalf.54 Regardless of a state’s 
ability to disguise its involvement in a cyber-attack via a proxy force, if the attack in 
question can be attributed to forces under its direction or control, then the state is legally 
responsible for the actions of its proxy.55 
B. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The ethics concerning UCW can be incorporated into existing discussions on jus 
in bello, commonly referred to as the moral principles governing conduct in war, and 
need not be broken out into a unique area for consideration. The prima facie ethical 
question would be: can computers be used as weapons? Similar to the argument that 
objects with the capability to cause harm or death are not all categorized as weapons, the 
argument can be made that the intent of employment of a tool, in this case a computer, to 
create foreseeably harmful consequences is the means by which computers earn weapons 
status and the employment of them against an adversary may be considered a use of 
force.56 In support of the use of cyber weapons, Denning and Strawser argue that it is 
“ethically obligatory” to use cyber weapons in place of kinetic weapons as long as the 
52 Ibid., 20. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Hathaway et al., “The Law of Cyber-Attack,” 41. 
55 Harold Hongju Koh, “International Law in Cyberspace” (Remarks|Remarks presented at the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference, FT Meade, MD, September 18, 2012), 4, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm. 
56 William J. Bayles, “Moral and Ethical Considerations for Computer Network Attack As a Means of 
National Power in Time of War” (U.S. Army War College, 2000), 9. 
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action is just and there is no significant loss of capability.57 Citing as advantages, these 
experts observe that, all other things being equal, cyber weapons are less risky to military 
personal because of the operational distance that can be achieved with their employment, 
and because cyber weapons can deliver kinetically equivalent military objectives without 
necessarily resulting in loss of life to one’s adversary, nor to innocents and non-
combatants.58 Drawing on their example of manned verses unmanned aircraft, the 
parallel exists, in the case of a fully justified war, to achieve the same effects using a 
cyber means, without impacting the actor’s ability to fight justly, and then because of 
their associated lower risk and cost to conduct, militaries are obligated to employ cyber 
means.59 Furthermore, these experts would contend that in the case of a just war, the just 
fighter will bear an even larger burden with regard to the tenets of proportionality and 
necessity, thus requiring them to accomplish their ends with the means that uses the least 
amount of force and would incur the least amount of risk.60  
Rowe, in his paper “Ethics of Cyberwar Attacks,” posits that two key factors of 
cyber-attacks can be employed to mitigate the associated collateral damage: targeting 
precision and repair mechanisms.61 Target precision provides the means whereby attacks 
are limited not only by the specificity of the target machines, but also a more granular 
level of specific critical software aspects on these machines.62 The use of repair 
mechanisms allows for implementation of attack vectors that are easily reversible, either 
by doing no real harm, perhaps only making code segments unavailable for specific 
periods, or by providing a cyber-antidote to a neutral third party to be held until the end 
57 Dorothy E. Denning and Bradley J. Strawser, “Moral Cyber Weapons: The Duty to Employ Cyber 
Attacks,” in The Ethics of Information Warfare, ed. Luciano Floridi and Mariarosaria Taddeo (Springer, 
2012), 87. 
58 Ibid., 88. 
59 Ibid., 87. 
60 Ibid., 89. 
61 Neil C. Rowe, “Ethics of Cyber War Attacks,” in Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism, ed. Lech 
Janczewski and Andrew M. Colarik (Idea Group Inc (IGI), 2008), 107. 
62 Ibid. 
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of hostilities.63 As Denning and Strawser point out, reversibility would be of immense 
value for stability and reconstruction operations and would allow for critical 
infrastructure to be targeted and restored within hours rather than the days, weeks, and 
months that would be associated with like infrastructure targeted by kinetic weapons.64 
This will be further elaborated upon in Chapter VI, when we present the way forward for 
UCW. 
The case for the morality of cyber weapons is not without detractors. Rowe cites 
the difficulties associated with identifying attackers and targets in cyber, the high 
cost/low reusability of cyber weapons, and the secrecy associated with conducting cyber-
attacks as why their use is ethically questionable.65 He goes on to posit that since the 
ethics of using cyber weapons is questionable, states should enact an ethical cyber policy 
by doing one of three things: 1) pledge to never employ cyber weapons, 2) pledge to not 
use cyber weapons as a first strike capability, or 3) pledge to only use cyber weapons in 
response to cyber weapons.66 Adopting Rowe’s proposal to never employ cyber weapons 
would effectively concede cyberspace to the multitudes of state and non-state actors that 
are currently conducting cyber activities today, often with no regard for legal or ethical 
constraints. A better course of action would be to conduct operations in cyberspace 
within the precepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, against legitimate military targets 
whereby employing cyber means would achieve the desired effects but with less risk and 
collateral damage than the same effects might be achieved by a kinetic means.67 
Likewise, his proposal to not employ cyber weapons as a first strike option could give 
rise to the employment of harmful kinetic first strike options that may cause unnecessary 
civilian casualties and unintended collateral damage, both of which may have been 
avoided with the employment of an equally just but discriminate cyber means.68 Lastly, 
63 Ibid., 108. 
64 Denning and Strawser, “Moral Cyber Weapons,” 91. 
65 Rowe, “Ethics of Cyber War Attacks,” 108. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Denning and Strawser, “Moral Cyber Weapons,” 93. 
68 Ibid., 97. 
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his third proposal to only use cyber weapons in response to cyber can be countered with 
the same arguments used against the prior two proposals; chiefly when the means are 
currently employed across the spectrum of cyberspace, it is ethically and morally 
incumbent upon those with the capability, against legitimate military targets, to employ 
just cyber means which would achieve the same effects as just kinetic means, but with 
less risk and collateral damage.69 These arguments are the basis for our position that 
UCW is a more ethically responsible means of achieving effects than traditional UW. 
It is essential for the sponsor forming and controlling cyber militias to understand 
the legal and ethical considerations of employing civilians in a cyber-attack role. Civilian 
cyber warriors, a facet of UCW operations employing resistance or proxy forces, can be 
subject to that state’s domestic criminal laws, which is not the case if the same actions 
were undertaken by a member of an opposing military force.70 Additionally, these 
civilian cyber warriors, and their military cohorts, may be attacked with any legal means, 
wherever they may be found, and the associated collateral may not be deemed excessive 
due to the threat posed by the cyber warrior.71 These are just some of the concerns that 
must be taken into consideration when planning to use proxy forces to conduct UCW. 
As presented above, employment of cyber weapons is a contentious issue that will 
be made even more so by the employment of proxy cyber militias during unconventional 
warfare. However, the current legal and ethical framework for conducting a just war is as 
applicable for this type of employment of forces as it has been for the employment of 
kinetic weapons since its inception. The advantage to examining these issues within the 
existing legal and ethical framework is that when employing a cyber means to 
accomplish a just military objective, the desired effect may be accomplished with more 
precision, less collateral damage, and with a keen eye on leveraging the target for future 
operations. Until such time as there is a kinetic means that can be employed to the same 
69 Ibid., 93. 
70 Charles Dunlap, “The Intersection of Law and Ethics in Cyberwar: Some Reflections,” Air & Space 
Journal, January 1, 2012, 6. 
71 Ibid., 6–7. 
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effect and reversed in the same timeframe, it would be a difficult argument to not employ 
the cyber means, all other things being equal. 
C. ATTRIBUTION 
The simplest definition for cyber attribution is “determining the identity or 
location of an attacker or an attacker’s intermediary”72 Cyber attribution also should 
consider identification of intermediaries, whether they are willing or unwilling, and the 
traceability of the attack, starting from the target and tracing backwards to the attacker.73 
In addition, it should consider sponsors of attacks, especially in cases where the sponsors 
are nation states, but are not directly involved in the attacks themselves. Attribution is 
inherently limited by the capability of attackers to time-offset their attacks while 
simultaneously routing these attacks through intermediaries in many jurisdictions, some 
benign and some hostile, further complicating the attribution effort.74 
Technology allows for the near complete anonymity of actors in the cyber domain 
and severely hampers attribution efforts.75 Typical computer networks are not designed 
with attribution in mind. In some instances the networks’ own capabilities unintentionally 
complicate the act of attribution because of the ease by which information, such as sender 
addresses can be “spoofed.76 While possible to improve the attribution process via 
technological features like logging, tracing, and unique communication keys, these 
options alone may not be sufficient to provide attribution in cases of extreme action.77 
Attribution means beyond the information infrastructure will be required to meet the 
72 David A. Wheeler and Gregory N. Larsen, Techniques for Cyber Attack Attribution (Defense 
Technical Information Center, 2003), 1, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA468859. 
73 Jeffery Hunker, Bob Hutchinson, and Jonathan Margulies, “Role and Challenges for Sufficient 
Cyber-attack Attribution” (Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, 2008), 5, 
http://www.thei3p.org/docs/publications/whitepaper-attribution.pdf. 
74 Wheeler and Larsen, Techniques for Cyber Attack Attribution, 53. 
75 Stephen J. Lukasik, “A Framework for Thinking About Cyber Conflict and Cyber Deterrence with 
Possible Declaratory Policies for These Domains,” in Proceedings of a Workshop on Deterring Cyber 
Attacks: Informing Strategies and Developing Options for U.S. Policy, 2010, 16. 
76 Wheeler and Larsen, Techniques for Cyber Attack Attribution, 5. 
77 Hunker, Hutchinson, and Margulies, “Role and Challenges for Sufficient Cyber-Attack 
Attribution,” 11. 
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standard of sufficiency, especially if the objective is to determine not only the attackers, 
but their sponsors.78  
The risk of nation states using attribution techniques against its own citizenry to 
suppress independence and civil liberties is a concern that has led to the development of 
technologies that provide anonymity and to the rejection of policies that prohibit all 
anonymous activity.79 Hunker, Hutchinson, and Marguiles propose the creation of an 
acceptable and sufficient means of attribution without destroying non-attribution.80 They 
contend that most states will emphasize maintaining their strategic flexibility and would 
accept a system that guarantees attribution in the case of offensive or defensive 
employment of cyber weapons by nation states.81 We contend that states would prefer to 
maintain the capability to conduct their own operations in cyberspace in a clandestine 
manner, and therefore may not be willing to accept a system that guarantees attribution, 
assuming such guarantees were even possible.  
Without adequate attribution there would be no basis for taking action against 
cyber-attackers or their sponsors, thus setting the conditions for a successful 
anonymously sponsored UCW campaign. Offensive operations, such as computer 
network attack, could be employed in a UCW scenario with high confidence that the 
sponsor of such attacks could remain anonymous if so desired. The overall difficulty with 
attribution provides for the perfect opportunity to conduct a covert UCW campaign that 
gives the resistance force flexibility and the resistance sponsor anonymity. 
 
78 Ibid. 
79 Wheeler and Larsen, Techniques for Cyber Attack Attribution, 50–51. 




                                                 
IV. CASE EXAMINATION 
This section will examine three cases relevant to UCW. The first two, the Russo-
Georgian conflict and the Syrian conflict, will be conducted in three parts: the word, the 
messenger and the deed. The word portion will examine the underlying message that was 
the unifying theme for the movement, what the movement’s stated or unstated goals 
might be, and the events that led to the movement’s creation. The messenger portion will 
examine the means and methods that were employed to spread the word, how the 
movement conducted their recruiting, and then how they managed their day to day 
operations. Lastly the deed portion will delve into the tactics, techniques and effects of 
the movement’s actions, at both an operational level and a strategic level. The approach 
for the third case on Tunisia’s revolution will vary because it exemplifies third party, 
non-state actors, working on behalf of a resistance movement. This case will examine the 
events that set the conditions for success and posit that the existence of dissident and 
diaspora media, cyber activists, Anonymous, and coordinated cyber operations in support 
of revolutionaries in Tunisia were able to effect socio-political change within that 
country. 
A. CASE 1: THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR: CYBER MILITIA IN 
SUPPORT OF CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS 
Cyber-attacks, in support of conventional military operations have a great deal of 
potential to be force multipliers on today’s complex battle fields. Imagine a simultaneous 
attack in cyber space and in the physical realm, designed to cripple a country’s ability to 
communicate, both internally and externally, and making it virtually unable to defend 
against a military assault by conventional forces. In 2008, that very scenario was carried 
out in the Russo-Georgian conflict with Russian conventional operations supported and 
its success enhanced by a carefully coordinated cyber strike, via a surrogate force, that 
was able to render the Georgian Republic incapable of defending itself in either the cyber 
or physical domain.  
 27 
What was the popular message used to create to movement that spawned the 
surrogate force? How was the surrogate force recruited and empowered to carry out the 
cyber-attacks? What are the odds that this type of an attack would be successful? How 
likely is it that given the near simultaneity of the assaults that they were not coordinated 
and orchestrated by the attacking state? These are some of the questions that have been 
asked and examined following the ground and cyber conflict between Georgia and Russia 
in 2008. In this case, we will examine this conflict in terms of how the narrative that was 
the genesis for the conflict was used to organize and empower a surrogate force, and then 
the actions and impact of the surrogate force.  
The conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 on the surface would appear to 
be the result of longstanding animosity between neighbors; however, the conflict was 
much more complicated and nuanced. Though the principal players in the conflict were 
these two nations, the actual conflict was a proxy for longstanding animosity at the local, 
regional, and international level. At the local level, this conflict has its roots in the ethnic 
strife rampant in the Soviet satellite states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia initially sought more autonomy within 
the Georgian Republic, but supported by their Russian neighbors and their 1992 blanket 
offer of Russian citizenship for former citizens of the Soviet Union their demands were 
escalated from autonomy to complete independence.82 Though this conflict has gone 
through a number of cycles prior to the conflict in 2008, the movement began to pick up 
speed with the declaration of independence by Kosovo in February of 2005. These factors 
lead to a major push by the Russian Republic of North Ossetia to call for unification with 
the breakaway Georgian province of South Ossetia.83 This conflict also served as a proxy 
for the ongoing friction between NATO and Russia with regard to NATO expansion into 
former Soviet satellite states; the level of economic and political support for the 
breakaway Georgian provinces was seen to increase when the NATO backed Kosovo 
82 Andreas Hagen, “The Russo-Georgian War (2008): The Role of the Cyber Attacks in the Conflict” 
(The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, May 24, 2012), 3, 
http://www.afcea.org/committees/cyber/documents/TheRusso-GeorgianWar2008.pdf. 
83 “Russia’s N.Ossetia Wants Unification with Georgia’s S.Ossetia,” Russian News Agency, RIA 
Novosti, May 20, 2008, http://en.ria.ru/world/20080520/107888655.html. 
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independence was declared and when Georgia was accepted for membership in that 
organization.84 The conflict escalated from words to actions on August 7, 2008 when 
Georgian troops responded to bombardments by South Ossetian forces by entering the 
South Ossetian capital, to which the Russian military launched an overwhelming 
response in the physical domain, while patriotic Russian hackers launched attacks in 
cyber space to oppose the Georgian invasion.85  
1. THE WORD 
An interesting facet of this conflict were the actions of a proxy cyber militia to 
carry out a series of attacks which served to destabilize and degrade the Georgian 
Republics current operations, indirectly supporting the goals of Russia to destroy the 
republic’s international stature and value to NATO. These cyber-attacks were the result 
of a long-term process of creating the proper atmosphere and conditions, all closely 
integrated with the messaging in support of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, backed by 
Russian forces, and their plans to solidify the breakaway regions in support of a “step-by-
step” independence effort.86 To add legitimacy to its involvement, Russia played on its 
close economic ties to the region and took steps to solidify its position by offering 
Russian citizenship to any former Soviet Union citizens, thus paving the way for future 
intercession on behalf of these Russian citizens.87 Within the cyber domain this objective 
would require a long-term program to not only identify “hacktivists” that were friendly to 
the South Ossetian / Russian cause but to identify the means and methods of bringing the 
force of the cyber militia to bear. The message was designed to appeal to Russian 
nationalist supporters both within and outside of Russia, focusing on encouraging self-
mobilization of the local Internet users by spreading “For our motherland, brothers!” or 
“Your country is calling you!” hacktivist messages across web forums.88 The Russians 
84 Christian Lowe, “Russia Tightens Ties with Georgian Rebel Areas,” Reuters, April 16, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/16/us-russia-georgia-breakaway-idUSL164428920080416. 
85 Hagen, “Russo-Georgia War,” 5. 
86 Lowe, “Russia Tightens Ties with Georgian Rebel Areas.” 
87 Hagen, “Russo-Georgia War,” 3. 
88 Dancho Danchev, “Coordinated Russia vs Georgia Cyber Attack in Progress.” 
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also sought to enhance their position in the global energy markets, using the pretext of 
supporting the breakaway regions as means of degrading the legitimacy of the Georgian 
government and directly threatening their role as a competing source of energy.89 To 
bring the conflict to a personal level, a messaging campaign was run concurrently that 
equated the president of the Georgian Republic, Mikheil Saakashvili, to Adolf Hitler.90 
Leading up to the actual conflict members of the cyber militia attempted to influence 
international public opinion regarding the struggle by manipulating non-scientific online 
polls on international news sites in an attempt to justify future Russia’s actions as a 
peacekeeping intervention.91 The effects of this campaign was the establishment of a 
nationalist Russian movement, the legitimization of their social, political, and economic 
ties with the breakaway regions, a favorable picture in the world press, and a blanket of 
villainy applied to the Georgian Republic and its leaders. 
2. THE MESSENGER 
As with most wars, this one began as a war of words. The message was initially 
disseminated to the target audience using traditional methods such as print journalism, 
but transitioned to chat rooms and web blogs as the call to action gained momentum. 
While the outcome being sought was clearly in favor of Russian interests, the Russian 
government took great pains to separate the message from the messenger. While not able 
to directly attribute the actions of the cyber militias to official government sanction, 
Project Grey Goose, an open source intelligence initiative to examine this conflict, 
hypothesized as to the true origins of the cyber-attack after examining the registration and 
hosting of the site stopgeorgia.ru, the site carrying the majority of the coordination, 
targeting, and specific hacking tools for this attack. Project Grey Goose was able to 
establish a geographic proximity, not a direct connection, between this site and the 
89 David Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study Georgia 2008,” Military, Small Wars Journal, 2011, 4, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf. 
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Russian GRU (equivalent to the U.S. NSA).92 To further isolate the source of the 
messaging for the conflict they presented circumstantial evidence of connections between 
the Russian government and Russian youth organizations, including Nashi and United 
Russia, via a Russian media report “that has provided new evidence pointing to how the 
Russian government sponsors and pays leaders of Russian youth organizations to engage 
in Information Operations up to and including hacking to silence or suppress opposition 
groups.”93 The overall goal of the Russian government may have been to, either directly 
or indirectly, insure that there existed a focused cyber militia that understood their 
opponents center of gravity, and that the methods and techniques were identified and in 
place to employ these forces against a target and at a time of their choosing.94 In the end, 
while there is no direct connection between the Russian government and the attacks, there 
is enough evidence to make it unlikely the Russians would be able to achieve the success 
that they were able to without direct coordination with the civilian nationalists militias 
that they were able to organize, equip, and employ as a proxy force without having to 
directly intercede or act in order to achieve its objectives. 
3. THE DEED 
It appears that that the attack preparation had been going on for some time and 
that online forums were used to coordinate the attacks providing target lists and details 
about target Georgian websites.95 The overall objective of the attacks was to deny and 
disrupt information flows within Georgia, hoping that the isolation from information 
would serve to demoralize and disorient both the citizens and the leadership of Georgia.96 
The warning shots for conflict escalation may have been heard as early as July 20, with a 
92 “Project Grey Goose Phase II Report,” Scribd, 15–19, accessed August 13, 2013, 
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series of distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) that were able to effectively shut 
down some Georgian websites.97  
From an operational perspective, Russian hacker forums, websites, and chat 
rooms were planning and anticipating these attacks for several weeks, leading to 
reconnaissance and probing attacks that gradually increased in scope and complexity as 
the onset of the cyber and physical conflict drew closer.98 Perhaps anticipating a 
retaliatory strike in response to the cyber-attacks on Georgia, the Russian-supported 
hacker militia also targeted their counterparts in the Georgian hacker community.99 The 
principle command and control node for these attacks appears to have been a Russian 
hacker forum StopGeorgia.ru where there was an established hacker hierarchy that 
coordinated the targeting, training, and employment of the exploits used to attack the 
Georgian websites.100 The attacks and tools had the same characteristics as those 
employed in the past by the Russian Business Network (RBN); indeed, in some cases the 
attackers used tools and actual botnets known to be under RBN’s control. Further, the 
attacks appeared to have been staged and activated just prior to the launch of the Russian 
ground offensive.101 A series of DDoS attacks against Georgian web-sites started a day 
before the ground campaign between Georgian and Russian military units engaged in 
physical conflict in South Ossetia. Logs of these attacks trace at least a portion of them 
back to servers located on the networks of Russian state-operated firms Rostelecom and 
Comstar.102 The attackers accomplished their goals without the required volume of traffic 
to overload a service by targeting vulnerability in a built in feature of MySQL that 
97 John Markoff, “Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks,” York Times, August 13, 2008, sec. Technology, 
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allowed the attackers to overload the backend database servers that supported the 
websites.103  
Three other programs known to have been used were used to overload servers 
with traffic, while a fourth was intended to add functionality to websites, but was altered 
to overload the computing capability of servers by requesting non-existent web pages.104 
This level of organization and planning allowed for ordinary Russian citizens to attack 
the Georgian government websites with the aid of programs distributed through friendly 
sites.105 The emergence of sites like StopGeorgia.ru within hours of the ground conflict, 
the pre-existence of a detailed target list with known vulnerabilities, and the support of a 
large cyber militia prepared to execute the attacks shows a level of detail and planning 
that many believe would not be expected without coordination and instruction from the 
forces that were to conduct the ground assault.106 Reports estimate a total of 54 websites 
in Georgia related to communications, finance, and the government, sites whose denial of 
availability would be beneficial to the overall Russian military campaign, were attacked 
by cyber militia elements within Russia that disrupted communication between the 
Georgian government and its citizens as well as the outside world.107  
The immediate response was for the Georgian government to relocate its websites 
to hosting locations in the U.S. to work around the DDoS attacks, so that these 
government sites might be able to resume their role communicating and providing 
guidance internally and externally in this time of crisis.108 Another, more potent, reason 
for the choice to relocate government web services to the U.S. may have been to deter 
further cyber-attacks against the sites hosted on U.S. soil to avoid the unintended 
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consequences of bringing the U.S. into the conflict.109 While the impact of the cyber-
attacks was devastating to the Georgian government’s ability to respond to the Russian 
invasion, it could have been worse; destructive cyber-attacks against crucial 
infrastructure, accessible over the Internet were not carried out, leading some to believe 
that predetermined limits were in place on the cyber-attacks just as they were on the 
ground attacks.110  
Attacks by the Russian cyber militia were integral to the effort to deny and 
degrade the Georgian government’s ability to convey vital information, both internally 
and externally. Additionally, the overwhelming effects in the physical domain, including 
the ground invasion, naval blockade, and bombing around the oil pipeline, allowed the 
Russians to achieve their strategic objective of demonstrating the inability of the 
Georgian government to defend its sovereign territory in both the physical domain and 
cyberspace.111 The benefit of the unofficial cyber militia in this conflict is undeniable. 
Using unskilled cyber partisans with simple cyber tools, these forces were able to 
decisively deny and disrupt key elements of Georgian government communication and 
infrastructure, and may have been able to do more.112  
It appears that within the international community countries like China and Russia 
have identified the value of such cyber militias, whereas countries like the United State 
have yet to realize their potential.113 The key to the success of this operation was the 
detailed efforts that went into enumerating the target environment, the identification of 
targets and vulnerabilities, the pre-packaging of malicious payloads, and the coordinated 
exploitation.114 This operation was targeted in nature, based on the desired effects, and 
focused on isolating the key areas that the Russian military intended to attack. This had 
109 Ward Carroll, “Cyber War 2.0 — Russia v. Georgia,” Defense Tech, 1, accessed December 17, 
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the subsequent effect of providing indicators of impending attacks on key centers of 
gravity, hindering opposition response, denying command and control elements that are 
actively engaged in the conflict, and in a broader sense to create a sense of national 
helplessness because to the psychological effects of isolation.115  
The Russo-Georgian conflict may not be the first incidence of a combination of 
attacks in the physical domain and cyberspace, but it is an excellent example of 
conducting a cyber-attack via a proxy force, the hallmark of unconventional warfare, in 
support of the larger strategic and operational objectives of a conventional force. The 
attacks by the cyber militia were critical to destabilizing the government of the Republic 
of Georgia, denying it access to its critical communications infrastructure, and allowing 
its opponents to control the perception of the conflict leading up to and during the actual 
conflict on the ground. While there is no direct attribution to the Russian government for 
the cyber-attacks, based on the complexity and coordination evident from the attacks, 
evidence indicates something more robust than an ad hoc community of nationalist 
hackers being involved. The Russians were able to leverage their significant advantage in 
kinetic forces and benefit from the actions of the cyber militia to decisively defeat the 
Georgians. The lessons to take away from this case, and for future research, include the 
benefits of both the murky attribution situation and of the simultaneous employment of 
cyber and kinetic weapons.  
B. CASE 2: SYRIAN ELECTRONIC ARMY: CYBER MILITIA IN SUPPORT 
OF THE STATE  
In this case we will examine the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) and its role in the 
ongoing conflict between pro-Assad forces and opposition forces in Syria. We will 
examine the narrative that was the genesis of the conflict, how this narrative was 
employed to organize and empower a surrogate force, and then the actions and impact of 
the surrogate force in the conflict. This case will demonstrate how the Syrian Electronic 
Army employed cyber means as a surrogate force to support the Assad regime and its 
effort to resist internal and external forces seeking regime change. Some of the questions 
115 Ibid. 
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we seek to answer are: What was the popular message used to create the movement that 
spawned the surrogate force? How was the surrogate force recruited and empowered to 
carry out the cyber-attacks? What are the methods employed and the targets that this 
force attacked and to what effect? We will look at the available data and determine how 
the practices and effects might be leveraged for future SOF operations using cyber 
warfare in support of unconventional warfare.  
1. THE WORD 
With the rise of the networked society, the days of combatant forces conducting 
operations in the physical world alone has gone the way of the cavalry. This has been 
especially apparent with the Arab Spring popular resistance movements in the Middle 
East and North Africa, where protestors have exploited the asymmetric capabilities 
afforded to a weaker combatant by conducting operations in cyberspace against the 
states. While this has characterized the Syrian uprising as well, that conflict has also 
given rise  to an open and organized pro-government cyber militia that is actively 
targeting internal and external opposition to the Assad regime.116 This militia, which 
calls itself the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), claims that it was launched in May of 2011 
and is comprised of “a group of young people who love their country and have decided to 
fight back electronically against those who have attacked Syrian websites and those who 
are hostile to Syria.”117  
SEA repeatedly asserts that it is not an officially sanctioned organization, rather 
just an ad hoc group of enthusiasts that strike back against those who are attempting to 
destabilize Syria via cyber space.118 In a speech on June 20, 2011, President Bashar al-
Assad lauded the SEA as a “real army” operating in a virtual world. While SEA 
welcomed these comments, it also took great pains to reiterate that it was not affiliated 





                                                 
with any government organization.119 Nevertheless, the SEA has taken a decidedly pro-
regime stance, urging passive and active resistance against both forces inside Syria that 
are opposing the state as well as supporting cyber-attacks on individuals, groups, and web 
organizations that are seen as opposing the Assad regime.120 This is a significant 
expansion of the scope of most cyber resistance movements, moving from defending 
one’s own position to actively attacking not just people and organizations that oppose 
you, but in some cases the companies that produce software, for example Microsoft or 
mobile phone application developers, that is employed by those the movement 
opposes.121 
The SEA was founded as a means for young Syrian computer enthusiasts to 
provide support in what they perceived as the ever increasing opposition to the Syrian 
government.122 The group, whose lineage can be traced back to the Syrian Computer 
Society, an organization once headed by current Syrian President al-Assad, first emerged 
as an entity on Facebook in response to the dissident movement in Syria gaining 
momentum.123 The group has an interesting relationship with Facebook; whenever a page 
has been identified as associated with the SEA, Facebook then moves to shut it down, 
triggering the migration of the organization to a new page in a perpetual cycle (see Figure 
2).124  
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Figure 2.  Screenshot of an alleged Facebook message sent to the Syrian 
Electronic Army notifying them of their page removal.125 
There has been rising criticism within Syria for the perceived unfair practice of 
censoring SEA pages by Facebook without justification or notice, a practice that is not 
applied to Syrian opposition forces.126 There appears to be an uneasy truce between the 
SEA and Facebook, as the SEA has been able to maintain an unpublicized page with the 
same information, and have more than eleven thousand members, since May 26, 2011.127 
This organization also maintains a presence on Twitter and YouTube that hosts before 
and after videos of targets, the reasons particular sites were targeted, and the messages 
that were left on the targets sites.128  
125 Ibid., 3. 
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127 Ibid., 3. 
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2. THE MESSENGER 
The SEA began its early recruiting and organizing via Facebook pages and has 
been supported by a group calling itself “Syrian Hacker School” that is a repository for 
cyber tools, recruitment, training, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for 
attacking vulnerable websites.129 Then, with heavy reliance on social media platforms 
such as Facebook and Twitter, it organized and managed multiple spamming campaigns, 
as well as denial of service attacks, against targets they deemed as hostile to the Assad 
regime.130 The group employs its own website to provide the latest details, both in 
English and Arabic. It offers accounts and screen captures of its latest success, as well as 
media clips from news outlets about its activities, allowing the organization to tout its 
successes, as a means to bolster support and to warn against opposition.131  
While the Assad regime is afforded plausible deniability by its distance from the 
organization with regard to international opinion and international law, there is some 
evidence that there are close, if hidden, ties between the two groups. The SEA’s original 
key members have all been replaced by a new organization that functions like the hacking 
collective Anonymous; this change is commonly believed to have resulted because of a 
leak of information deemed critical by the regime attributed to the SEA that put the group 
at odds with its benefactors.132 Once this change of leadership happened, the Facebook 
accounts and hacker aliases that were being tracked for SEA disappeared and were 
replaced by a far less organized group of hackers that assumed the mantle of the SEA.133 
In addition to loose connections with the Syrian government, there are some equally 
vague connections between the SEA and Iranian hackers. While not definitive, they could 
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be indicative of collaboration between the two, but most likely are just an indicator of 
exploiting the ease of access afforded by the lack of security on the targeted sites.134  
The SEA has received a tremendous amount of attention from the Syrian media, 
with articles ranging from those in support of the SEA, to those critical of Facebook for 
oppressing its sites.135 This has led to the SEA creating its own internal library of select 
regional and international media coverage, with selective translation being employed to 
present the organization in a positive light and to exclude any sections critical of the SEA 
or the regime.136  
3. THE DEED 
When examining the deeds of the SEA, we will look at significant activities 
conducted in support of its goals, how it was able to accomplish these actions, and the 
effects that resulted from their actions. The primary objective of the SEA is the 
defacement of Syrian opposition websites, usually run by groups or individuals, via 
attack tools made available on the group’s Facebook pages.137 The exact vector being 
employed for their attacks is not known, only that it is referred to as a “widely available 
program” indicating that the SEA is not exploiting an unknown vulnerability via a “zero-
day” or new method, but rather using an existing vector targeting a known vulnerability 
to accomplish their objective.138 As of May 2011, the SEA claimed to have defaced over 
50 websites, replacing the existing pages with temporary pages touting pro-regime 
messages of “truth,” but not outright destroying the targeted websites (see Figure 3).139  
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Figure 3.  Syrian Electronic Army Facebook page announces that over 50 
websites have been attacked, and that it did not destroy content of 
any of the websites.140 
The second area of focus for the SEA is Western websites, to include government, media, 
groups, and individuals that it perceives as being either anti-Syria / Assad or as 
supporting the Syrian opposition (see Figure 4).141  
 
Figure 4.  Screenshot of defaced website of Royal Leamington Spa Town 
Council at http://www.leamingtonspatowncouncil.gov.uk.142 
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Of note is that some of the Western websites have been targeted by the SEA not 
because of any outright activity by the site in question, but rather because of the actions 
of the countries within which the sites reside, presumably because the SEA was not able 
to target these offending countries directly.143 Other theories as to why these sites were 
targeted include cases of mistaken identity, lack of understanding of the foreign countries 
language, pure mistakes, or because the targets were perceived as “soft” and therefore 
easy to exploit.144 The SEA was able to conduct mass defacements via exploiting a single 
vulnerability on a shared webserver, where the redirect tag was injected into the target 
database rather than requiring the attackers to upload the SEA page on the target site (see 
Figure 5).145 
 
Figure 5.  Claimed defacements by IP and country, May 16–June 19, 2011. 
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The SEA has been prolific in its attacks against Israeli government and tourist 
websites; however these sites were not targeted for any specific anti-Syria acts, but rather 
for the more traditional approach of attempts to “cleanse the web from Israeli websites 
that promote hatred towards the Palestinian people” (see Figure 6).146  
 
Figure 6.  Screenshot of defaced website of Israeli Member of Knesset Arieh 
Eldad.147 
These sites appeared to have been exploited via an HTML re-direct injection, but the 
underlying purpose for these attacks appears to not be a response to an anti-Assad or 
opposition position, but rather as a means of garnering media attention for the SEA, as 
was evidenced by the controlled manner in which the exploits were announced and 
publicized.148 The SEA has also maintained a steady information campaign via posting 
repetitive comments on prominent public figures Facebook pages, both as spam attacks 
and to draw attention to itself and to protest the target’s perceived support of the 
revolution in Syria (see Figure 7).149 
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Figure 7.  Syrian Electronic Army documents its “virtual demonstration” on 
U.S. President Barack Obama150 
Recalling the definition we will use for unconventional cyber warfare (UCW) (to 
achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace by, with, or through 
irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional 
military operations) the SEA provides a contemporary framework for employment of a 
cyber-militia in support of the State. The SEA organized, trained, equipped and 
mobilized in cyberspace, using social media both as its base of operations and its 
preferred battlefield. Arguments could be made that the SEA’s effectiveness against 
internal threats was due to the support of the State-run media and network. Their ability 
to accomplish objectives against external targets demonstrates the low barrier to entry 
and the ease in which one can fight in cyberspace. While the SEA’s targeting was not 
always optimal, it demonstrated that one need not employ cutting edge, or original threat 
150 Ibid., 8. 
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vectors to be successful contesting in cyber space. With the inherent vulnerabilities 
present in most software and hardware, target enumeration is one option to determine 
where to attack. However, these vulnerabilities make it possible to attack across a broad 
spectrum of cyberspace, in a version of cyber recon by fire. Either approach allows 
adversaries to identify vulnerabilities and exploit those vulnerabilities without the need 
for highly sophisticated forces. These existing vulnerabilities, the difficulty with 
attribution in cyberspace, and the low cost and technology threshold for cyber-attacks 
make this an ideal area to contest as part of a UCW campaign.  
C. CASE 3: ANONYMOUS – NON-STATE ACTORS AS CYBER MILITIAS  
Tunisia’s president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, had been in control for nearly 23 
years, yet Tunisia was “the first nation in the Arab world to have its leader removed 
through a popular uprising of its citizens or, more precisely, ‘netizens’ thanks to 
Tunisia’s modern communications infrastructure, pervasive Internet, and mobile phone 
network.”151 Although the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
and social media has been credited with much of the success of the Jasmine Revolution 
and subsequent movements associated with the “Arab Spring,” it does little to explain 
why these tools were effective.  
1. BACKGROUND 
Tunisia’s secular government maintained close diplomatic relations with Europe 
and the U.S. The population experienced greater prosperity, better educational 
opportunities, and the women enjoyed more freedoms than in other Arab countries. 
Throughout Ben Ali’s reign Tunisia had remained extremely stable, with no terrorism to 
speak of. However, Tunisia was not without its problems.152 The Tunisian people were 
exposed to greater economic disparity, a growing demographic youth bulge, overt 
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nepotism, and extensive government corruption all as a result of the Ben Ali regime’s 
policies.  
Tunisia’s unemployment rate was between 13 and 16 percent.153 Although this 
was greater than Egypt’s, Libya’s, and Algeria’s unemployment rates at the time, Tunisia 
had experienced very little instability in comparison.154 However, the unemployment rate 
of university graduates in Sidi Bouzid, where the Jasmine Revolution began, was 
between 25 and 30 percent.155 The youth bulge, combined with greater accessibility to 
higher education, created a growing number of youths either unemployed or 
underemployed for the jobs available in the Tunisian economy. Corruption, and an 
increasing cost of living coupled with unemployment, and an underemployed workforce 
had already resulted in uprisings within the Gafsa mining basin in 2008.  
Ben Ali had pledged to bring democracy and human rights to Tunisia early in his 
reign. Instead, he used the threat of radical Islamic movements to install and bolster his 
internal security apparatus, manipulate electoral processes, and co-opt officials. He was 
viewed as an authoritarian, but he was able to stabilize the country and bring tourism and 
investors into the country while keeping the Islamists out.156 He had been so effective at 
controlling the country that there was no visible opposition to his regime at the time of 
the revolution. The regime participated in the censoring of media outlets, blocking the 
formation of civil organizations, and detaining and torturing thousands of dissidents.157 
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However, his attempts to control Tunisia became less creative and more transparent as 
the growth of Facebook, Twitter, and the blogosphere helped to inform the population of 
news that was otherwise censored.158  
Dissidents and political conspirators, who had long advanced the notion of 
nepotism and corruption within the Ben Ali regime, had managed to garner little 
international attention until candid dispatches from Robert Godec, the U.S. Ambassador 
to Tunisia, were revealed detailing the opulent lifestyle members of the Ben Ali family 
enjoyed along with the rampant corruption present within the regime.159 The extent to 
which the leaking of U.S. State Department cables outlining the corruption and nepotism 
within the regime incited the revolution is debatable. However, it is undeniable the 
information within those documents had a psychological effect on the citizens of Tunisia. 
No longer were exiled bloggers and activists telling their story, but the U.S., a strong ally, 
appeared to share their concern.160 
The Tunisian people were highly connected despite Ben Ali spending the greater 
part of 23 years constructing a pervasive state security apparatus that existed in both the 
virtual and physical space. Tunisia had a well-developed mobile phone and Internet 
infrastructure with nearly nine out of 10 Tunisians owning a mobile phone. Of those, 84 
percent accessed the Internet at home through the state run ISP, the Tunisian Internet 
Agency. An additional 75 percent utilized the Internet at work and 24 percent relied on 
access to the Internet through public cafes.161 In 2011, Tunisia, though one of Africa’s 
smallest countries, had the fourth largest number of Facebook users on the continent 
158 Alexander, “Tunisia’s Protest Wave.” 
159 Nate Anderson, “Tweeting Tyrants Out of Tunisia: Global Internet at Its Best,” WIRED, accessed 
March 7, 2014, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/01/tunisia/. 
160 Sami Gharbia, “Chelsea Manning and the Arab Spring,” Nawaat, February 24, 2014, 
http://nawaat.org/portail/2014/02/28/chelsea-manning-and-the-arab-spring/; Narnia Bohler-Muller and 
Charl Van der Merwe, “The Potential of Social Media to Influence Socio-Political Change on the African 
Continent,” Africa Institute of South Africa, Policy Brief 46 (2011): 1–8. 
161 Brett Van Niekerk, Kiru Pillay, and Manoj Maharaj, “Analyzing the Role of ICTs in the Tunisian 
and Egyptian Unrest from an Information Warfare Perspective,” International Journal of Communications 
5 (2011): 1406–16. 
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along with the highest Internet penetration rate of any other African nation, 56.8 
percent.162 
However, penetration and connectivity had not equated to a free exchange of 
ideas or information. In the summer of 2010, digital activist, Global Voices and 
Readwriteweb contributor, Slim Amamou published a story exposing the Tunisian 
government’s capabilities. Amamou outlined the Ben Ali regime’s cyber capabilities 
including employing an estimated 600 cyber warriors and sophisticated DNS spoofing 
techniques utilized to obtain the username and passwords of Tunisians.163 These 
techniques would later be put to wider use to target dissidents and activists as the 
intensity of the uprising spread and the regime clung desperately to power. 
2. CHAIN OF EVENTS 
Mohamed Bouazizi’s suicide protest is credited as being the catalyst for the 
revolution in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. His actions on December 17, 2010, were in response 
to his frustration toward police actions taken against him, his inability to pay the bribe to 
recover his produce cart, and his governor’s refusal to hear his complaint.164 For weeks 
friends and residents in Sidi Bouzid staged demonstrations that led to the popular 
uprising resulting in the toppling of the Ben Ali regime.165 Despite the undeniable impact 
of the images and news of Bouazizi’s plight, which resulted in numerous copycat protests 
by individuals throughout the Middle East and Europe, it is necessary to begin our 
examination several months earlier in order to ascertain the impact of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), and later Anonymous, within this revolution.  
162 Bohler-Muller and Van der Merwe, “The Potential of Social Media to Influence Socio-Political 
Change on the African Continent.” 
163 Fabrice Epelboin, “Revolution 2.0: Rebooting Tunisia,” ReadWriteWeb, January 14, 2011, 
http://readwrite.com/2011/01/14/revolution_20_rebooting_tunisia; Yves Gonzalez-Quijano, “False 
Promises? The Social Media and Arab Political Change,” Media and Arab Transition, 2013, 60–63. 
164 Bohler-Muller and Van der Merwe, “The Potential of Social Media to Influence Socio-Political 
Change on the African Continent”; Noor, “Tunisia: The Revolution That Started It All | International 
Affairs Review.” 
165 Mohammed Bouazizi. A Tunisian Martyr, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jHw_auqod6Y&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
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Sami Ben Gharbia, a self-described Tunisian campaigner, blogger, writer, 
freedom of expression advocate, founding director of the advocacy arm of Global Voices, 
co-founder of nawaat.org, co-founder of the Arab Techies Collective, and co-organizer of 
the Arab Bloggers Conference, claims that PVT Manning’s release of U.S. secrets to 
WikiLeaks had also played a part in starting the revolution.166 Gharbia’s exposure to 
those secrets began in October 2010. According to Gharbia, “This is what we were 
looking for during the last decade of strategizing and theorizing about citizen dissent 
media, diaspora media, exiled media, and digital activism: the ability to inform and 
transform. This was momentum.”167 Gharbia contacted associates with whom he had 
worked on building anti-censorship strategies and campaigns and training non-violent 
protest movements. They decided to publish TuniLeaks on 28 November 2010 to 
coincide with the release by WikiLeaks.168  
The TuniLeak documents were to be released on google.appspot to enable 
Gharbia and his associates to change the IP addresses and negate the need for complex 
circumvention tools as Ben Ali’s regime would inevitably blocked them. Al Jazeera also 
released the “Palestine Papers” around this time.169 Once public, the documents were 
spread by a variety of means: as pdf. on Scribd, file sharing services, torrents, and on 
Facebook as images (spread further by Slacktivists). They were later passed on by CDs, 
thumb drives, and hard copies. Activists also began crowdsourcing the translation of 
many of the documents.170  
The Ben Ali regime began to take action in an attempt to restore order as the 
demonstrations and protests spread. It undertook an enormous effort to begin phishing 
and spear phishing to gain control of activist’s email and Facebook accounts in order to 
166 Gharbia, “Chelsea Manning and the Arab Spring.” 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Bohler-Muller and Van der Merwe, “The Potential of Social Media to Influence Socio-Political 
Change on the African Continent.” 5.  
170 Gharbia, “Chelsea Manning and the Arab Spring.” 
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delete content, accounts, and followers.171 It also began blocking many of the websites 
involved with either spreading the leaked information or that were assisting the protestors 
to mobilize.172 This prompted The Committee to Protect Journalists to send an open letter 
to the Tunisian government after learning local and international websites carrying news 
of the demonstrations in Tunisia had been blocked.173 Growing frustrated, the Ben Ali 
regime eventually resorted to blocking social media sites and the Google App Engine 
IPs.174 This evoked a response that Ethan Zuckerman has referred to as the “cute cat 
theory.” The nearly 3.6 million Internet users of Tunisia, seeking only to use the Internet 
to “share pictures of cute cats,” were affected by the Tunisian regime’s attempt to censor 
the Internet. The result was a population previously politically uninterested in the 
ongoing protests that was transformed into one that mobilized against the censorship.175 
What occurred next drew the ire of the hacker group Anonymous. Fresh off of attacks in 
support of Operation Payback to protest anti-piracy companies, Anonymous had then 
taken aim at PayPal, MasterCard, and others as they withdrew support to WikiLeaks in 
the wake of the release of secret U.S. State Department cables. Anonymous’ next logical 
target became the Ben Ali regime that had blocked access to the WikiLeaks website. 
#OPTUNISIA “began when one Anon began spamming the forum, drawing support from 
activists around the world.”176  
Generally, Anonymous’ motivation for action revolves around the central theme 
of freedom of information. Although this was not always the case, the group appears to 
have undergone some type of cognitive liberation around 2008 when the Church of 
Scientology attempted to censor leaked videos and information that was meant for its 
171 Yasmine Ryan, “Tunisia’s Bitter Cyberwar - Features - Al Jazeera English,” News, Al Jazeera, 
January 6, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/20111614145839362.html. 
172 Bohler-Muller and Van der Merwe, “The Potential of Social Media to Influence Socio-Political 
Change on the African Continent.” 
173 Anderson, “Tweeting Tyrants Out of Tunisia.” 
174 Carr, “In Tunisia, Cyberwar Precedes Revolution”; Gharbia, “Chelsea Manning and the Arab 
Spring.” 
175 Ethan Zuckerman- Cute Cats and the Arab Spring: When Social Media Meet Social Change, 2011, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tkDFVz_VL_I&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
176 Ryan, “Tunisia’s Bitter Cyberwar - Features - Al Jazeera English.” 
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membership only. The resulting attacks by Anonymous were characterized by one 
participant as not much more than “ultra coordinated motherfuckary” until Mark Bunker, 
an outspoken critic of the church, began to call for greater political action from the 
group.177 On February 10, 2008, Anonymous left the Internet and approximately 6,000 
people showed up to protest at Church of Scientology locations around the world.178 
As Anonymous mobilized on 4chan for Operation Payback in September 2010, 
targets were chosen and voted on, individuals worked collectively on documents to 
outline who were and who were not to be targeted by the group, and activists utilized 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) to better coordinate their actions. It appeared that a greater 
social/global consciousness within Anonymous had begun to emerge along with the 
principles that would govern how members should act.179  
On January 2, 2011, Anonymous launched #OPTUNISIA.180 Anonymous 
members carried out DDoS attacks upon initiating #OPTUNISIA stating, “this is a 
warning to the Tunisian government. Any organization involved in censorship will be 
targeted and will not be released until the Tunisian government hears the claim for 
freedom to its people.”181 It managed to disable eight websites to include those of the 
president, prime minister, several ministries, and the stock exchange with the initial 
attack. Tunisia’s state run ISP was also targeted.182 Its efforts did not stop there. A call 
for greater activism on the part of Anonymous began as greater numbers of Tunisians 
came into contact with the members of Anonymous on the web. Anonymous funneled out 
177 Gabriella Coleman, “Anonymous — From the Lulz to Collective Action | The New Significance,” 





181 Carr, “In Tunisia, Cyberwar Precedes Revolution.” 
182 Ryan, “Tunisia’s Bitter Cyberwar - Features - Al Jazeera English.” 
 51 
                                                 
videos of street protests and regime violence, provided resources to Tunisian activists to 
secure their online activity, and even created packets for use by the Tunisian activists.183  
As support to the protestors continued, so too did the regime’s attempts to deny 
the opposition freedom of maneuver in the physical and virtual space. On January 6, 
2011, Anonymous reported to Al Jazeera that its own site was under DDoS attack, but 
vowed to continue to DDoS that DNS server until after that day’s strike by the labor and 
lawyer unions.184 The regime continued to inject additional javascript into websites in 
order to obtain passwords and usernames of protestors, political activists, reporters, and 
bloggers. On January 7, 2011, Reporters Without Borders confirmed five cases of 
bloggers and online activists being arrested by the regime.185 One of those detained was 
Global Voices and ReadWriteWeb France contributor, Slim Amamou.186 The Electronic 
Frontier Foundation published a “greasemonkey” script on January 11, 2011, to strip 
away the additional coding, which had been emplaced by the regime, from websites for 
activist activities.187 In one last effort to retain power, Ben Ali announced an end to all 
net censorship and released all the remaining bloggers from custody on January 13, 2011. 
The following day, January 14, 2011, Ben Ali left the country.188 
Would all this have been possible without Anonymous, the Internet, mobile 
phones, traditional media, and social media? Rim Nour, a hacktivist who personally 
participated in the Jasmine Revolution, seems to believe so. Nour stated that, “the 2010 
Tunisian revolution was not a Wikileaks or Facebook or (a) Twitter revolution, but an 
uprising fundamentally powered by people and the socio-political and economic 
conditions of their lives.”189 Nour goes on to acknowledge the importance of the role 
183 Coleman, “Anonymous — From the Lulz to Collective Action | The New Significance”;” Ryan, 
“Tunisia’s Bitter Cyberwar - Features - Al Jazeera English.” 
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ICTs and the traditional media played in the revolution, but maintains the revolution 
“would have happened without social media, but not as fast.”190 Clay Shirky and 
Malcolm Gladwell have further supported the notion that social media tools are by 
themselves ineffective due to the state’s increasing ability to monitor them and that weak 
ties created amongst casual participants on social media cannot bring about any useful 
action.191  
The uprisings in the Gafsa mining basin occurred only two years prior, in the 
cities of Redeyef, Moularès, M’dhila, and Metlaoui, and shared many of the same 
concerns that mobilized people for the Jasmine Revolution. There was a large economic 
gap between the region and the rest of the country, massive unemployment, 
underemployment, corruption, nepotism, and perceived social injustices just as there was 
Sidi Bouzid. The unrest in Gafsa served as a catalyst for a variety people and civil society 
organizations to begin to coalesce; connecting “bread and butter” grievances to larger 
rule of law concerns.192 However, the protestors in the Gafsa mining basin were 
ultimately unsuccessful because they were unable to move beyond a local protest 
movement and resist the Ben Ali regime’s repressive response.193 What differs in the 
instance of the Jasmine Revolution were the several external influences present, such as 
TuniLeaks, WikiLeaks, Anonymous, diaspora and dissident media, social media, and 
ICTs, that were all leveraged to alter the scale of the conflict.  
 
 
190 Ibid., 5. 
191 Ibid. 
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3. CONCLUSION 
Does this case further perpetuate the “False Promise” myth that argues as Internet 
activism gains visibility in public spaces it becomes a part of the larger political game 
and that due to the political naiveté of the activists involved they are relegated to 
subordinate roles by the more politically astute?194 The Union of Unemployed Graduates 
from Tunis University managed to enlist the assistance of trade union leaders in Redeyef 
to support the continued mobilization of protestors. However, it was these leaders from 
Redeyef who formed the core of the negotiating committee and marginalized the 
younger, more inexperienced organizers from the Union of Unemployed Graduates in an 
attempt to secure their own interests within the bureaucracy.195 Conversely, the Internet 
activism and protests that played out in the events leading up to and during the Jasmine 
Revolution demonstrate that although the Internet activists were just as vulnerable to 
being subjugated by the more politically shrewd, the “False Promise” myth may be just 
that, a myth. Activists may avoid falling victim to the “False Promise” if they understand 
the role of information warfare and the supporting technologies to further their 
objectives. 
The Jasmine Revolution offers four primary lessons for conducting cyber 
operations in support of revolutionary movements: 1) It establishes the importance of 
information and communication technologies (ICTs), 2) external support via cyber 
means, 3) the usefulness of the narrative to attract vital external support, and 4) the value 
of recognizable dissident and diaspora media with an established reputation to 
compliment the movement’s physical operations, counter a regime’s attempts to isolate 
and subdue the revolution, both virtually and physically, and affect the ouster of a 
regime. These tactics were used to varying degrees throughout the “Arab Spring.” The 
diffusion of these techniques to other movements illustrates the importance of 
understanding why the tools of information warfare worked in one instance but not in 
another. 
194 Gonzalez-Quijano, “False Promises? The Social Media and Arab Political Change.” 
195 Gobe, behe Gafsa Mining Basin between Riots and a Social Movement.m 
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As a dimension of socio-political activism, ICTs provided an “immediacy of 
audience access” that enabled the movement to disseminate information in order to alter 
the perceptions and the will of both the local and international communities, provide the 
ability to coordinate and mobilize, and conduct psychological and command and control 
warfare against the regime.196 In an interview with a British journalist, Ben Ali’s 
propaganda minister, Oussama Romdhani, “confessed that ‘TuniLeaks was the coup de 
grace, the thing that broke the Ben Ali system’. The regime never understood that 
blocking websites doesn’t block information.”197 The actions of the regime toward the 
ICTs, specifically the Internet, demonstrated the importance of Ethan Zuckerman’s cute 
cat theory and how embedding the movement within benign spaces on the web can 
protect it from coercive measures taken by the regime.  
Anonymous referred to its interventions in Tunisia, and subsequent operations, as 
“new activism.”198 This illustrated potential of technology to influence the socio-political 
climate has emboldened its users. Some have claimed that “Anonymous has proven to be 
a mature political entity” and has grown into a sort of “global consciousness.”199 
Anonymous appears to have remained more pragmatic with its approach and understands 
the limitations of its capabilities based upon statements contained within software packets 
provided to Tunisian activists: 
(T)his is your revolution, you must hit the streets or you will lose, always 
stay safe, once you got (sic) arrested you cannot do anything for yourself 
or your people. Your government is watching you200 
The multi-modal warfare exhibited during this movement of DDoS attacks in support of 
protests and demonstrations, supplying news, video, and images to media and 
196 Bohler-Muller and Van der Merwe, “The Potential of Social Media to Influence Socio-Political 
Change on the African Continent”;” Van Niekerk, Pillay, and Maharaj, “Analyzing the Role of ICTs in the 
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197 Gharbia, “Chelsea Manning and the Arab Spring.” 
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Change on the African Continent.” 
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international organizations beyond the country’s borders, and delivering the knowledge 
and resources to activists in order to remain beyond the regime’s reach in cyberspace 
demonstrate how vital external cyber support is. 
In Tunisia, the establishment of external cyber support occurred mostly by 
chance. Anonymous’ initial intervention was under the premise of protesting the regime’s 
censorship policy. However, the interaction between the Tunisian activists and 
Anonymous point to how the role of Anonymous evolved as their collective 
consciousness grew to become more aware of the plight of the Tunisian citizens. In 
Egypt, Anonymous attacked Morsy for his “lack of care about the core values of 
democracy…”201 Anonymous targeted the Algerian government in response to human 
rights violations and repression of its citizens.202 The ability of movements, through the 
frame alignment process, to garner greater support from Anonymous suggests that it is 
beneficial to analyze what messages could be used in order to attract groups such as 
Anonymous to provide the necessary external support to movements in authoritarian 
countries. It is also worth mentioning that cyber activism presents many people a way to 
engage in political action that previously did not exist.203  
Last, it is important to recognize the value of established dissident and diaspora 
media with a proven reputation. Bloggers, reporters, and activists with a known penchant 
for reporting the truth can assist in gathering information and disseminating news to 
international media outlets, garnering external support as an intermediary, and, with a 
large audience, can influence the direction of the movement. A new Twitter handle or 
Facebook page would likely not have the same impact of an already established blogger 
or activist might have. Such was the case with Slim Amamou, “Slim was at the crossroad 
of a movement that could be mobilized and ready to fight in just a click.”204 Slim was a 
recognized personality who had been in public opposition to the Ben Ali regime for some 
201 Anderson, “Anonymous Threatens Morsy with Cyberwarfare.” 
202 “List of Targets of Arrested Computer Hackers,” Phys.org, March 6, 2012, 
http://phys.org/news/2012-03-hackers.html. 
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204 Epelboin, “Revolution 2.0.” 
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time prior to the revolution and was eventually detained during the uprising. Upon his 
release, he was appointed to the interim government. Although he later resigned, Slim’s 
experience points to the importance of a movement having individuals that can influence 
the movement before, during, and after the regime has been overthrown.205 
  
205 Gonzalez-Quijano, “False Promises? The Social Media and Arab Political Change,” 62. 
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V. UNCONVENTIONAL CYBER WARFARE: A THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
As stated earlier, the aim of this thesis is to assist planners in determining whether 
and how cyber warfare can support a UW campaign. In this chapter, we will first offer 
observations and recommendations regarding conditions that may be favorable to 
employing UCW. Then, utilizing FM 3-05-130 as a reference, along with the seven 
phases of unconventional warfare contained therein, we will provide a means to 
categorize and exercise lessons learned from the case studies involving Russia, Syria, and 
Tunisia to develop a UCW theoretical framework. Doing so will highlight the 
applicability of UCW to support or counter insurgencies, resistance movements, and 
conventional military operations. 
A. WHEN TO EMPLOY UCW 
This section will discuss characteristics that may assist planners in identifying 
opportunities to further demonstrate the potential of UCW. It complements the following 
section, which will discuss the employment of UCW within the framework of current, 
traditional UW phases.  
The following charts are used to identify the most connected / highest penetrated 
societies by ICTs as well as those countries that are most censored. The assumption is 
that a society with high level of Internet and mobile phone penetration is also highly 
connected and reliant on ICTs. Logically, it would seem that a highly connected yet 
highly repressive or closed society would be especially suitable to utilize UCW in 
support of U.S. strategic interests due to the difficult environment the U.S. would face in 
conducting a traditional UW campaign. 
Table 1 depicts the top 20 countries of mobile phones per 100 people. Table 2 
lists the top 20 countries by number of Internet users per 100 people. 
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Table 1.   Top 20 countries of mobile phones per 100 people206 
 





                                                 
 
Table 2.   Top 20 countries by number of Internet users per 100 people207 
Citing sources from FreedomHouse.org and the Committee to Protect Journalists, we 
have identified some of the most repressive countries in the world. These are shown in 
Table 3 (the “PR” stands for political rights and “CL” for civil liberties, with 1 being the 
best score and 7 the worst) and Table 4. 




                                                 
 
 
Table 3.   The most repressive countries in the world208 
 
Table 4.   Map of the Top 10 most censored countries209 
208 “Worst of the Worst 2012:  The World’s Most Repressive Societies,” Independent Watchdog, 
Freedom House, 2012, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/special-reports/worst-worst-2012-worlds-
most-repressive-societies#.U2v5-vldViM. 
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After cross-referencing the proceeding charts for countries that are both highly 
connected and highly repressive we find that only Saudi Arabia and Iran meet both 
criteria set forth by the assumptions. However, what is not mentioned are other 
contributing factors that would facilitate successful UCW efforts: the numbers of 
dissident and diaspora media and bloggers capable of influencing, transmitting, or 
otherwise assisting in a UCW campaign, underlying inter and intrastate tensions, and 
existing grievances between the population and government. Kirk Duncan provides 
additional thoughts on which environments may be more favorable than others to achieve 
success in UCW in his thesis, “Assessing the use of Social Media in Revolutionary 
Environment.”210  
While the initial assumptions and data only provide us with two countries that 
meet the criteria for both high rates of mobile phone and Internet penetration as well as a 
highly repressive regime, Iran and Saudi Arabia, we feel that this is misleading. If we 
examine the data related to the countries in our case studies, namely Syria, Russia, 
Georgia, and Tunisia, it becomes apparent that there are opportunities for the use of 
UCW regardless of how connected or closed a society is. According to worldbank.org, in 
2007 Georgia’s Internet penetration rate was slightly above eight percent and in 2008 had 
only risen to 10 percent.211 Despite this, the case of Russia versus Georgia demonstrates 
that cyber-attacks against even a minimally connected country can have dramatic effects, 
especially when supported by conventional military operations and limited strategic 
objectives. Freedomhouse.org reported that in 2009 Tunisia’s Internet penetration rate 
was around 34 percent.212 This figure seems counterintuitive and fails to address a 
number of things including the preexisting physical networks from the Gafsa Mining 
Basin uprisings, growing internal grievances, smart phone penetration, and external 
209 “10 Most Censored Countries,” Committee to Protect Journalists, accessed April 25, 2014, 
http://cpj.org/reports/2012/05/10-most-censored-countries.php. 
210 Kirk A. Duncan, “Assessing the Use of Social Media in a Revolutionary Environment” (Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2013), http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/34660. 
211 “Internet Users (per 100 People).” 
212 “Freedom on the Net: Tunisia,” Independent Watchdog, Freedom House, 2011, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2011/tunisia#.U2murcepqwM. 
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support from Anonymous received by the revolutionaries during the uprising. Lastly, 
internetworldstats.com reports Syria has a nearly 23 percent Internet penetration rate.213 
Assad’s ability to remain in power and counter the numerous factions that are pitted 
against him with the assistance of the SEA again demonstrates that the number of Internet 
users within the target country is not the only factor to consider when deciding whether 
or not to conduct a UCW campaign. 
Given the relatively low percentage of connectivity within each of these countries 
allows us to conclude that the penetration rates of ICTs are not as important as one may 
have previously thought. Rather, other factors including social media platform use, 
government censorship and surveillance protocols, circumvention tools, narratives, key 
influencers, grievances, target selection, etc., all play a role in determining how and when 
to apply UCW in pursuit of U.S. objectives.  
B. UCW FRAMEWORK 
Before discussing the seven phases, we discuss three overarching concerns that 
are evident throughout the analysis of the case studies, UCW, and the 7 phases of UW. 
These concerns are risk, cost, and flexibility. Addressing these first will provide 
background for their mention within the phases to which they apply.  
The topic of risk encompasses the domains of political risk, risk to mission, and 
risk to men; UCW seeks to mitigate all these. Reducing the ability of target governments 
to attribute UW operations, via cyber, to the U.S. can lessen the associated political risk 
involved with its application. Political risk is further mitigated by the target government’s 
inability to attribute cyber activity with any relative certainty. This decreases the 
likelihood of retribution, avoids international legal issues involving the violation of 
States’ sovereignty, and further reduces potential political damage incurred by an 
unpopular or unsuccessful operation. These factors may increase the attractiveness of 
213 Internet World Stats, “Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, Internet Users in the 
Middle East and the World - June 30, 2012,” Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, June 
30, 2012, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm. 
 64 
                                                 
U.S. assistance to an insurgency that might otherwise be resistant to U.S. aid, providing a 
greater level of deniability to the supported movement.  
We also judge that the application of UCW can greatly reduce the risk to mission. 
UCW may be applied across the spectrum from soft power to hard power by providing 
planners and operators with the ability to turn on and off support, increase or decrease 
aid, precision target, tailor effects to the operational requirement, and reduce the exposure 
of operators to the target regime. The applicability of UCW across the spectrum enables 
planners to provide solutions and responses that are measured and scalable to achieve 
U.S. strategic interests and objectives, which may not be achievable through traditional 
methods alone.  
The preferred application of UCW to conventional UW is apparent when 
discussing its advantages with respect to the risk associated to personnel. The application 
and conduct of UCW provides operators the distance necessary to eliminate or greatly 
reduce life-threatening risk, as previously discussed in the ethical use of UCW. However, 
the use of UCW not only reduces risk to U.S. personnel but also to resistance and 
insurgent forces operating against the target regime by providing a layer of anonymity in 
cyberspace. Similarly, UCW can mitigate risks to the target in the form of minimizing 
collateral damage, civilian risk, risk to U.S. forces, and risk to proxy forces supporting 
conventional military operations. These reduced risks may also result in reduced costs 
and increased stability during transition. 
UCW, with its low associated costs, may become even more appealing in the 
future to decision makers as the U.S. enters into an era of greater fiscal constraints. Here, 
cost refers to the monetary assistance required to support an unconventional warfare 
operation as well as the cost of reconstruction efforts provided to countries that have been 
the target of traditional conventional military operations (CMO). For years, planners have 
assumed that support to insurgencies called for the U.S. to provide guns and money to 
achieve desired end states. We argue that not only does UCW reduce the reliance and 
need to supply guns and money to a resistance, but the traditional logistics tail associated 
with an unconventional warfare operation is also greatly reduced with the application of 
UCW.  
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Lastly, UCW provides planners and operators flexibility in terms of measured 
responses and applications. Cyber may enable simultaneous operations to occur 
throughout the UWOA, ranging from overt to covert or clandestine, with anonymity 
provided by operating in the virtual as opposed to the physical space. Multiple supporting 
operations may be occurring within the UWOA spanning the spectrum from overt to 
clandestine, offering the operator the ability to choose to apply hard or soft power as the 
mission dictates, yet retain ample flexibility by remaining compartmentalized. Cyber also 
enables operations to be conducted as broadly, as narrowly, or as specialized as required 
by the mission.   
The following sections will discuss the seven phases of unconventional warfare, 
what is commonly expected to occur during these phases, where we see UCW’s 
application to each phase either to augment a UW campaign or as a standalone option, 
and draw upon relevant examples from the previously described case studies.  
1. PREPARATION 
Three general processes occur during the traditional Preparation Phase, Phase 1: 
intelligence preparation of the environment (IPOE), war planning, and shaping 
operations. Phase 1 can occur globally and continuously in order to set conditions 
favorable for the conduct of UW. All elements of national power, diplomatic, 
information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement 
(DIMEFIL), can be used in addition to preparation of the environment (PE) activities to 
further shape the environment locally, regionally, and globally.214 Utilizing UCW, cyber 
capabilities may enable operators to conduct PE remotely, continuously, and globally 
from the micro to macro level without attribution, or without violating physically the 
sovereignty of the target state. In an effort to provide methods of employment to planners 
considering the use of UCW, we propose three approaches that draw on similarities found 
in the preceding case studies as suggestions for possible use in future operations. 
214 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare. 
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The first approach suggests that we build the infrastructure to be used for future 
operations. This method is similar to the one utilized in the case of Russia versus Georgia 
where the emergence of sites like StopGeorgia.ru occurred within hours of the ground 
conflict and the existence of a predetermined target list that detailed the known 
vulnerabilities allowed a large cyber militia to remain hidden until the specific moment 
they were called on to execute the intended attacks.215 The next tactic would be to utilize 
an already existing organization complete with organic infrastructure and personnel that 
may be repurposed to support operations. This approach draws on similarities from the 
Syrian Electronic Army case study. The SEA traces its lineage back to the Syrian 
Computer Society, and as a cyber-militia, began conducting operations in support of the 
state’s government when the dissident movement in Syria began gaining momentum.216 
Lastly, we advocate for an approach that would require identifying, infiltrating, and/or 
influencing an existing organization and infrastructure that exists with limited purpose 
but is malleable enough for the formation of new goals and purposes that would be in line 
with U.S. objectives. Or, in the most likely case, the goal, or purpose, of the group may 
be re-tasked, influenced, or otherwise morphed to meet the demands of the fluid UW 
environment. Similar actions occurred with Anonymous as their original reason for 
involvement in Tunisia began in response to Ben Ali’s censorship of WikiLeaks, but 
transformed to supplying active assistance to the resistance and coordinating attacks in 
the virtual space to aid in demonstrations in the physical space as it came into contact 
with greater numbers of Tunisian activists.217 
2. INITIAL CONTACT 
Initial contact, or Phase 2, occurs when a pilot team makes physical contact with a 
resistance element within the unconventional warfare operational area (UWOA). The 
pilot team then assesses the viability of conducting UW within the UWOA, the 
215 Krebs, “Security Fix - Report,” 2. 
216 Noman, “The Emergence of Open and Organized Pro-Government Cyber Attacks in the Middle 
East,” 1. 
217 Coleman, “Anonymous — From the Lulz to Collective Action | The New Significance.” 
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compatibility of U.S. and local interests and objectives, as well as arranges for the 
reception of initial assistance and ARSOF units.218  
Initial contact conducted within the construct of a UCW campaign offers several 
advantages including the previously discussed ethical, fiscal, and political reasons 
favoring the use of cyber in UW. Phase 2 operations conducted within the unconventional 
cyber warfare operational area (UCWOA) favors operators by providing an inherent 
clandestine and covert capability central to the facet of non-attribution associated with 
operating in cyberspace. This fundamental characteristic of cyber lends itself to two 
important notions regarding the assessment of the feasibility to conduct UW within the 
UWOA.  
First, the compatibility of U.S. and local interests and objectives may align more 
closely within the UCWOA as the apparent lack of sponsorship or attribution may create 
a more politically feasible climate for insurgent or resistance leaders to act in a manner 
that is more favorable to U.S. strategic interests and objectives than may otherwise permit 
with the presence of actual forces operating within the UWOA.  
Conversely, initial contact within the UCWOA may allow the U.S. to determine 
more quickly and accurately that an insurgent or resistance leader is less likely, or more 
resistant, to act in the interest of U.S. strategic objectives thus enabling the U.S. to back 
out of negotiations and withdraw support with less exposure and risk than may be 
feasible with the presence of U.S. forces on the ground in the UWOA. This would also 
enable the U.S. to begin assessing other leaders more rapidly to counter any movement 
gaining momentum that does not align with U.S. strategic interests. 
Second, the technical capabilities and competencies of the resistance or insurgent 
forces may be assessed to a greater degree than in a traditional phase 2 operations. Doing 
so may lead to a higher degree of assurance that operations within the UCWOA are 
feasible, thus affording the U.S. a greater chance of achieving its goals and objectives.   
218 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare. 
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These concepts were apparent within each case study to a varying degree; 
significant is that during this phase each case shows how the command and control of the 
cyber militias had as thorough of an understanding of the effects that they could wield via 
their forces as they did of their opponent’s capabilities that they wanted to mitigate. 
Although Egypt is not part of the case studies, the aftermath of its revolution has proven 
to be an example where a better assessment of who, or which groups, aligned more 
closely with U.S. strategic interests would have been beneficial and could have been 
conducted within the cyber realm. Egypt represented an opportunity to identify other 
groups that may have served to counter the Muslim Brotherhood and also align more 
closely with U.S. interests.  
3. INFILTRATION 
Infiltration, or Phase 3, simply denotes the phase of the campaign in which 
ARSOF units infiltrate the UWOA and, the unit, or units, merely linkup with the pilot 
team and the irregular force. If they are unable to contact the irregular force, they 
continue the area assessment begun by the pilot team in order to confirm or deny their 
findings.219 Traditional UW Phase 3 entails risk of discovery and compromise to the UW 
practitioner.   
Cyber’s speed and control favor the use of UCW within the infiltration phase. The 
presence of existing cyber infrastructure and personnel can enable infiltrations to be 
initiated and performed quickly, allowing the application of force, the Employment 
Phase, to occur much earlier than in a traditional UW effort. This was apparent in the 
case studies as the Russians sought to exploit tools and actual botnets known to be under 
the control of the Russian Business Network (RBN) to quickly bring cyber forces to bear 
to coincide with the launch of the Russian ground offensive.220  
Cyberspace also affords a degree of control not normally experienced in 
traditional UW as operations can be initiated and aborted with relative ease and with 
219 Ibid. 
220 Markoff, “Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks,” 2. 
 69 
                                                 
minimal risk. During the Russian/Georgian conflict malicious packets were pre-packaged 
as malicious payloads, employing easy to follow instructions and simple attack tools, 
which allowed unskilled cyber partisans to conduct coordinated exploitation across the 
broad spectrum of the cyber domain.221  
4.  ORGANIZATION 
Organization, or Phase 4, encompasses the development of a capable, irregular 
force, to include an auxiliary, underground, guerrilla force, and area command 
structure.222 For practitioners operating within the traditional UW framework, Phase 4 
demands a majority of attention given the complexity of organizing disparate groups to 
accomplish specific objectives as well as balancing the inherent constraints of risks, 
costs, and time.  
The advantages of cyber within Phase 4 include greater flexibility in terms of 
developing organizations that are required to accomplish specific objectives and the 
clandestine method in which these organizations may be built. As noted in the discussion 
of Phase 1, UCW is not bound by the traditional UW organizational structures and 
although it may be useful to think of diaspora media and dissident bloggers as an 
underground and auxiliary, hackers and hacktivists as a guerrilla force, and influential 
persons within cyberspace as area commanders, it is not necessary, nor always conducive 
to thinking in an unconventional manner, to do so.  
In a UCW environment planners may choose to develop one or more of the 
previously described UCW models to meet the needs of the mission. UCW permits the 
development of organizations and their infrastructure simultaneously, in a 
compartmented manner, well beyond the normal scrutiny of a target regime, or for that 
matter the participants or potential participants. Planners and operators overcome the 
constraints inherent with traditional UW by operating in near anonymous and non-
attributable ways to maintain freedom of action. 
221 Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study Georgia 2008,” 6. 
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5. BUILDUP 
Buildup, or Phase 5, involves the expansion of the organization and its 
capabilities. The focus during this phase is on recruitment, training, and targets 
appropriate to the actual requirements of the mission.223 To accomplish these tasks 
within a UCW campaign operators may leverage cyber capabilities to develop multiple, 
redundant, compartmented organizations that provide durability to the ongoing UW 
effort.  
A way to grow the organization is through recruitment. Arguably, with cyber the 
barriers to entry into a resistance movement are much lower. The Tunisian Revolution 
witnessed the growth of the presence of Anonymous, as it provided a discrete micro-
protest possibility to many that otherwise was previously unavailable.224 To utilize this 
platform of protest enables those who otherwise wouldn’t participate an opportunity to do 
so. However, as groups grow during this phase, the possibility of being infiltrated 
remains, just as it does in traditional UW. 
Operating outside the bounds of traditional time and space constraints allows for 
the development of redundant organizations maximizing cyberspace’s inherent 
compartmentalization. The insurgent or resistance organization may become layered as a 
result of the redundancy and provide an organic level of durability to the UW effort. 
Creating redundancy in the organization serves to mitigate the effectiveness of COIN 
efforts undertaken by the target regime. The groups within the organization may quickly 
be re-tasked or repurposed to meet the challenges of the dynamic UW environment. 
Additionally, existing infrastructure may also be leveraged to mitigate the exploits of any 
COIN effort. This was apparent in the Tunisian experience as activists disseminated 
information via pdf. on Scribd, file sharing services, on torrents, and on Facebook as 
images, and also began crowdsourcing the translation of many of the documents.225 
223 Ibid. 
224 Coleman, “Anonymous — From the Lulz to Collective Action | The New Significance.” 
225 Gharbia, “Chelsea Manning and the Arab Spring.” 
 71 
                                                 
Lastly, there is an existing asymmetric component within cyber. The size of these groups 
is scalable to the mission; the requirement no longer exists to get big in order to win.  
6. EMPLOYMENT 
Within the traditional UW campaign the Employment Phase, or Phase 6, involves 
irregular forces operating in a combat or hostile environment. ARSOF units ought to 
ensure that the effects of the activities continue to support the goals of the theater 
commander as these operations increase in scope and size.226 Cyber may be easily tied to 
supporting conventional military operations (CMO) or major combat operations (MCO). 
Just as cyber was instrumental in setting conditions for Russia’s kinetic strike into 
Georgia, cyber may also be used to support protests and demonstrations as was the case 
in Tunisia. Upon commencement of Phase 6 planners and operators need to be mindful of 
employing constraints in preparation for transition whether they are supporting kinetic or 
non-kinetic operations.  
7. TRANSITION 
Transition, Phase 7, is typically the most difficult and sensitive phase of any UW 
effort. Transition may not necessarily require demobilization, but may require some type 
of stability operations.227 As discussed earlier, cyber provides a high level of control that 
enables operators to turn off the effects of operations, thus returning disrupted services to 
normal operations. However, it may prove to be far more difficult to turn off the cyber 
militia that carried out the attacks. This is highlighted by the events surrounding the Arab 
Spring when at the conclusion of Ben Ali’s reign in Tunisia, Anonymous continued to 
assist in revolutions throughout the Middle East and elsewhere. Further analysis may be 
warranted to determine the optimal model to organize, build, employ and transition for 
UCW operations. 
226 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare. 
227 Ibid. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
UCW is not always the appropriate means to accomplish ones objective, however 
because of the flexibility and the ability to achieve results in environments that have 
limited connectivity, it is a viable option in many cases. Just as with traditional UW, the 
phases of UCW do not have to occur in order, may occur simultaneously, and depending 
on the mission requirement, may not occur at all. For example, as the resistance 
movement in Tunisia gained momentum, a large and effective organization developed 
that required only ‘logistical support’ via technical means in order to continue to be 
organized and employed against the regime, thereby bypassing the organization phase. 
The phases may also occur out of sequence, as the case of Russia v. Georgia illustrates 
the buildup of organization and infrastructure prior to populating the cyber militia with 
actual cyber guerrillas. Phases may also receive varying degrees of emphasis.228 UCW 
allows for the greatest amount of flexibility, lowest cost, lowest inherent risk, and highest 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
Our thesis has demonstrated that cyber is often times a means to an end, but it 
may also be the means with the least amount of inherent cost, risk, and the greatest 
opportunity to accomplish one’s goals. Cyber means have the same ethical and legal 
constraints as their kinetic equivalent; however, because of the lesser risk, cost, and 
associated damage, they present a more palatable option than kinetic ones, all things 
being equal. During the examination of UCW we identified three approaches to creating 
or repurposing a cyber-militia. Each of these provides advantages and disadvantages, and 
none are a complete standalone solution. During the course of future research into the 
topic of UCW, it would be beneficial to determine when and under what conditions each 
approach can be leveraged to maximize opportunities for success. 
As demonstrated by the case examinations and the proposed framework, UCW 
can enable a force the opportunity to exploit inherent weaknesses in cyberspace to 
support their operational objectives. UCW can be used as a means to an end by 
supporting concurrent major combat operations or to support ends directly in a standalone 
fashion. The speed, flexibility, low cost, and low-risk nature of UCW make it an 
appealing possibility that should be added to the formal lexicon of options within the 
realm of irregular and unconventional warfare. 
As previously stated, similar to traditional UW, the phases of UCW do not have to 
occur in order, may occur simultaneously, and depending on the mission requirement, 
may not occur at all. The phases may also occur out of sequence to facilitate the buildup 
of organization and infrastructure prior to populating the cyber militia with actual cyber 
guerrillas. Phases may also receive varying degrees of emphasis, depending on the 
mission requirements, available infrastructure, and the amount of preparation to the cyber 
battlefield that has been conducted prior to UCW operation. UCW allows for the greatest 
amount of flexibility, lowest cost, lowest inherent risk, and highest degree of control, all 
things being equal, and stands as a viable option to traditional UW options. 
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